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Book Review
Torture, with Apologies
By Eric
A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule. New York, NY: Oxford University Press,
2007. Pp. 328. $29.95.
TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS.

NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL

Richard A. Posner. New York, NY: Oxford University
Press, 2006. Pp. 208. $18.95.
EMERGENCY. By

Reviewed by Thomas P. Crocker*
Torture has become a topic of pressing national concern.' The specter
of torture haunts both popular culture and policy debates over how best to

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law. J.D., Yale Law
School; Ph.D., Vanderbilt University. I would like to thank Holly Crocker, Scott Hershovitz,
Patrick Hubbard, and Anthony Jarrells for their helpful comments and conversations. I would also
like to acknowledge the helpful research assistance of Kristina Cooper and Reynolds Elliott. More
than is ordinary, I would like to stress that all the remaining errors are mine alone.
1. See, e.g., Jonathan Alter, Time to Think About Torture, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 5, 2001, at 45, 45
("We can't legalize physical torture; it's contrary to American values. But... we need to keep an
open mind about certain measures to fight terrorism, like court-sanctioned psychological
interrogation.... Nobody said this was going to be pretty."); Alan M. Dershowitz, Is There a
Torturous Road to Justice?, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2001, at 19 ("When, if ever, is it justified to resort
to unconventional techniques such as truth serum, moderate physical pressure and outright
torture?"); Michael Hirsh & Mark Hosenball, The Politics of Torture, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 25, 2006,
at 32, 32 ("The question is whether waterboarding, however effective, is torture-and whether
Americans ought to be doing such things at all."); Anthony Lewis, The U.S. Casefor Torture, N.Y.
REV. BOOKS, July 15, 2004, at 4, 4 ("Reading through the memoranda written by Bush
administration lawyers on how prisoners of the 'war on terror' can be treated is a strange
experience. The memos read like the advice of a mob lawyer to a mafia don on how to skirt the law
and stay out of prison."); Jane Mayer, The Black Sites, NEW YORKER, Aug. 13, 2007, at 46, 56
("Among the few C.I.A. officials who knew of the details of the detention and interrogation
program, there was a tense debate about where to draw the line in terms of treatment."); Jane
Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America's "ExtraordinaryRendition " Program,
NEW YORKER, Feb. 14 & 21, 2005, at 106, 108 ("By holding detainees indefinitely, without
counsel, without charges of wrongdoing, and under circumstances that could, in legal parlance,
'shock the conscience' of a court, the [Bush] Administration has jeopardized its chances of
convicting hundreds of suspected terrorists, or even of using them as witnesses in almost any court
in the world."); Ends, Means and Barbarity, ECONOMIST, Jan. 11, 2003, at 18, 18 ("If, in their
efforts to defeat al-Qaeda, American officials are moving towards a policy of using torture on a
systematic basis ...this would be a remarkable and ominous reversal of policy."); Is Torture Ever
Justified?, ECONOMIST, Jan. 11, 2003, at 9, 9 ("How can democratic governments best fight an
enemy like al-Qaeda... ? In ways that uphold the values democracies stand for, is the answer one
would like to give. Yet faced with the sort of threat al-Qaeda poses, this line is not always so easy
to draw.").
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provide for national security under threat of potential terrorist attacks.2 In the
eyes of many, the practice of torture stands as an exemplar of official abuse.
Legal and moral prohibitions against torture focus attention on institutional
commitments to fundamental human dignity and liberty. In the eyes of
others, engaging in torture, and its descriptively milder forms of cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment, would be justified under conditions of
national necessity. In the choice between adhering to principle in the face of
a potential loss of many thousands of innocent lives or resorting to torture,
the tough-minded pragmatist claims that torture is the lesser evil. 3 In the
hands of those who prize consequences over principles, "ticking-bomb"
hypotheticals-imagining officials confronting a suspect they know can
reveal the location of a large bomb about to detonate in a crowded.city-are
designed to wrench from even the most ardent opponent of torture a reluctant
admission that the practice would be justified under such exceptional
circumstances.4
Moreover, among those who prize principle over
consequences, under extreme, ticking-bomb scenarios, many would nonetheless defend the actions of a public official who would be willing to act
outside the law to do whatever
is necessary, including torturing suspects, to
5
protect national security.

2. The television show 24 is perhaps the most relevant example of how the threat of terrorism
has been represented in popular culture. See Jane Mayer, Whatever It Takes: The Politics of the
Man Behind "24," NEW YORKER, Feb. 19 & 26, 2007, at 66, 68 (discussing how the television
show 24 "sends a political message" and makes viewers confront threats to American national
security by playing off "the anxieties that have beset the country since September 11 th"); Teresa
Wilz, Torture's Tortured Cultural Roots, WASH. POST, May 3, 2005, at C1 ("If you're addicted to
Fox's '24,' you probably cheered on Jack Bauer when, in a recent episode, he snapped the fingers of
a suspect who was, shall we say, reluctant to talk. ... Torture's a no-brainer here. Jack's got to
save us all from imminent thermonuclear annihilation.").
3. Indeed, with regard to the issue of brutality and torture, Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule
claim that "[w]here coercive interrogation can save lives, not engaging in it might seem the more
brutal choice, especially to those whose lives are at stake." ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE,
TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 205 (2007); see also MICHAEL
IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL: POLITICAL ETHICS IN AN AGE OF TERROR 18 (2004) ("In the war on
terror, I would argue, the issue is not whether we can avoid evil acts altogether, but whether we can
succeed in choosing lesser evils ....
");Jean Bethke Elshtain, Reflection on the Problem of Dirty
Hands, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION 77, 87 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004) ("Far greater moral guilt
falls on a person in authority who permits the deaths of hundreds of innocents rather than choosing
to 'torture' one guilty or complicit person.").
4. See David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1440
(2005) ("The ticking time bomb is proffered against liberals who believe in an absolute prohibition
against torture. The idea is to force the liberal prohibitionist to admit that yes, even he or even she
would agree to torture in at least this one situation.").
5. See Oren Gross, Are Torture Warrants Warranted? Pragmatic Absolutism and Official
Disobedience, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1481, 1528, 1526-34 (2004) (proposing "an absolute legal ban on
torture while, at the same time, recognizing the possibility... of state agents acting extralegally...
and seeking ex post ratification of their conduct"); Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses
to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1023 (2003) [hereinafter Gross,
Chaos and Rules] ("This Extra-Legal Measures model.., informs public officials that they may act
extralegally when they believe that such action is necessary for protecting the nation and the public
in the face of calamity, provided that they openly and publicly acknowledge the nature of their
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A choice therefore seems to be unavoidable once the topic of torture is
introduced: adhere to a principle prohibiting the practice of torture in the face
of potentially dire risks or admit that circumstances and consequences matter
to one's assessment of the legitimacy of torture. Two recent contributions to
the growing literature on the purported clash between civil liberties and national security, Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule's Terror in the Balance
and Richard Posner's Not a Suicide Pact,6 eschew the practice of principle,
articulating instead consequentialist apologies on behalf of official actions
ranging from the suppression of dissent to the practice of torture.7 In their
hands, constitutionally protected civil liberties become luxuries to be upheld
only when conditions are thought normal but are to be substantially ignored
when security threats are perceived as high.
Both projects maintain the proposition that "[a] national emergency,
such as a war, creates a disequilibrium in the existing system of constitutional rights,",8 requiring that the balance between civil liberties and national
security be recalibrated in a way that favors security over liberty. Because,
on their view, civil liberties impede effective security policy, "[t]here is a
straightforward tradeoff between liberty and security." 9 Indeed, Posner and
Vermeule claim that "[t]here is no reason to think that the constitutional
rights and powers appropriate for an emergency are the same as those that
prevail during times of normalcy,"1 ° whereas there is ample reason to think
that increased national-security benefits justify relaxing constitutional norms.
Given the background practice of balancing rights against governmental
needs, a second issue arises regarding which institution is best situated to
make judgments about the optimal balance of security and liberty. Both
projects adopt the view that judges should defer to executive decisions and
"that judicial review of governmental action, in the name of the Constitution,
should be relaxed or suspended during an emergency.''"
According to
Richard Posner, "That is the pragmatic response, and pragmatism is a

actions."); Sanford Levinson, "Precommitment" and "Postcommitment": The Ban on Torture in

the Wake of September 11, 81 TEXAS L. REv. 2013, 2053 (2003) ("[A]nyone who accepts the
necessity of line-drawing.., must then, presumably, be willing to defend, both as citizens and as
potential lawyers for the state, quite awful conduct that comes right up to the line.").
6. RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL

EMERGENCY (2006).

7. Posner and Vermeule claim: "If dissent weakens resolve, then dissent should be curtailed. If
domestic security is at risk, then intrusive searches should be tolerated." POSNER & VERMEULE,
supra note 3, at 16. Richard Posner similarly claims: "Even torture may sometimes be justified in
the struggle against terrorism .... POSNER, supra note 6, at 12.
8. POSNER, supra note 6, at 147; accord POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 16 ("The

reason for relaxing constitutional norms during emergencies is that the risks to civil liberties
inherent in expansive executive power-the misuse of the power for political gain-are justified by
the national security benefits.").
9. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 12.

10. Id. at 16.
11. Id. at 15.
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dominant feature not only12 of American culture at large but also of the
American judicial culture.,
It may well be the case that pragmatism is embedded in both American
legal and cultural practices.' 3 It is far from clear, however, that pragmatism
or American culture at large ever requires abandoning deeply held commitments to principles, such as the prohibition against torture, in order to pursue
consequentialist aims. 14 Undoubtedly, not all constitutionally protected
rights are absolute. The state may constrain the exercise of some rights, such
as the right to free speech or the right to personal liberty, by providing appropriate justifications and by acting within carefully circumscribed limits.
Courts review government actions that infringe on the absolute enjoyment of
some rights through a method of tiered scrutiny under which the more an action invades core values protected by a right the greater its justification and
narrower the infringement must be. 15 By contrast, other rights, such as the
right not to be enslaved, admit of no justified derogations. Any attempt to
balance state need against asserted rights must therefore take place against a
background of prior judgments about what kinds of specific rights and liberties are in fact appropriately subject to balance.
In the post-World War II era, a growing consensus has developed that
some state actions, such as torture, are simply inconsistent with civilized society and broader principles of human rights. 16 Through what Harold Koh
calls a process of transnational legal process, human-rights norms, including
the norm prohibiting torture, have taken root not only in international instruments but also in domestic law.' 7 Federal courts, addressing claims brought
under the Alien Tort Claims Act, have stated that the prohibition against

12. POSNER, supra note

6, at 147.
13. Richard Posner wears the mantle of the modem pragmatist, claiming that "pragmatism is
the best description of the American judicial ethos and also the best guide to the improvement of
judicial performance-and thus, the best normative as well as positive theory of the judicial role."
RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 1 (2003).

14. For an excellent criticism of Posner's brand of pragmatism, see Michael Sullivan & Daniel
J. Solove, Can PragmatismBe Radical? Richard Posner and Legal Pragmatism, 113 YALE L.J.

687 (2003).
15. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (reviewing gender-based government
action under intermediate scrutiny); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (reviewing sexualorientation-based government action under rational basis); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200 (1995) (reviewing racial classifications under strict scrutiny). See generally G. Edward
White, HistoricizingJudicialScrutiny, 57 S.C. L. REV. 1 (2005).
16. International treaties to which the United States is a signatory, such as the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368
(approved by the United States Senate on Apr. 2, 1992), the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOc.
NO. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 113, and the Geneva Conventions, see, e.g., Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949, opened for
signatureAug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3517, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, all prohibit the use of torture. Domestic
implementation of the Convention Against Torture includes the Torture Victim Protection Act of
1991 (TVPA), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
17. Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1502 (2003).
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torture is a jus cogens norm under which the "torturer has become-like the
pirate and the slave trader before him-hostis humani generis, an enemy of
all mankind."1 8 Yet in the years immediately following the events of
September 11, 2001, this trend towards greater respect for human rights,
which included a near-universal consensus on the prohibitory norm against
torture, has been subject to question as a matter of state policy in the face of
terrorist threat. Although officials have both defended and committed acts of
torture,' 9 at least in official declarations, "[f]reedom from torture is an
inalienable human right, and we are committed to building a world where
human rights are respected and protected by the rule of law. 2 0
Despite official commitments to the prohibition against torture, both
projects take a tough-minded pragmatist approach and conclude that official
state torture is permissible under appropriate circumstances. 2' Such circumstances are determined by balancing civil liberties against national security.
Their version of pragmatism becomes an apology on behalf of tough security
measures, including official use of torture. If torture works to provide
greater security benefits, on the apologists' view, torture is justified by employing a simple calculation weighing security gains against losses to liberty.
In such situations, "[c]onstitutional rules do no good, and some harm, if they
attempts to adjust the balance as threats wax and
block government's
22
wane."
A primary goal of Posner and Vermeule's book is to "restrain" civil
libertarians, philosophers, and other lawyers from "shackling" the
23
government in its pursuit of the proper balance of liberty and security.
With regard to the prospect of "transferring large chunks of power to the executive during emergencies[,] ... [t]he real risk is that civil libertarian panic
about the specter of authoritarianism will constrain government's ability to

18. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Kadic v. Karad~id, 70
F.3d 232, 243 (2d Cir. 1995) (restating Filartiga's holding that "official torture is prohibited by
universally accepted norms of international law"); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights
Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that the right to be free from torture is ajus
cogens norm); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 717 (9th Cir. 1992)
("Given this extraordinary consensus, we conclude that the right to be free from official torture is
fundamental and universal, a right deserving of the highest status under international law, a norm of
jus cogens."). The Supreme Court affirmed the narrower approach taken by Filartiga to private
rights of action for claims involving piracy or torture under the Alien Tort Statute in Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004).
19. See Mark Mazzetti & Margot Williams, In Tribunal Statement, Confessed Plotter of Sept.
11 Burnishes Image as a Soldier, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2007, at AI5 ("The Bush administration has
long denied that any of the harsh techniques it used on high-value detainees could be considered
torture. But some of the techniques used on Mr. Mohammed, including 'waterboarding,'... have
since been abandoned by the C.I.A.").
20. Statement on United Nations International Day in Support of Victims of Torture, 41
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 1074, 1074 (June 26, 2005).
21. POSNER, supra note 6, at 81-86, 152; POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 191.
22. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 31.
23. Id. at 275.
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adopt cost-justified security measures.
Although ours is a government of
enumerated powers designed to restrain and channel the exercise of national
powers to avoid any prospect of tyranny, according to Posner and Vermeule,
under emergency conditions, it is a composite creature, the "civil libertarian,"
that must be feared and restrained. 25 Tough-minded consequentialists stay
focused on the goal of protecting national security, while the supposed more
tender-minded civil libertarians place principled impediments in the
pragmatist's path.
Each of these projects provides apologies on behalf of torture. Each of
these projects also presents powerful arguments in favor of unilateral executive action in the face of national-security emergencies, but neither reflects
the considered judgments of our constitutional tradition, which views with
suspicion unchecked and unbalanced exercises of power. Moreover, their
proposals are deeply problematic, not merely because of panic or democratic
failure, or the fear that officials will ratchet up their intrusions on civil
liberties,26 but also because the pragmatist tradition requires intelligent policy
proposals, which under our constitutional tradition means policies made with
broad deliberative participation under conditions of checks and balances
among institutions.
Traditions may be slow to change, and new directions may be difficult
to achieve. In the face of new security challenges, Posner and Vermeule as
well as Richard Posner each provide powerful arguments for meeting these
challenges by balancing security and liberty free from principled constraints.
Their arguments for abandoning principle in favor of consequences,
however, are misguided, and their proposed renewed emphasis on executive
balancing has all the dangers of authoritarianism with none of the advantages
of pragmatic institutional design. What is presented as a fair-minded act of
balancing, designed to provide an optimal equilibrium of liberty and security,
under closer scrutiny becomes a rhetorical trope that obscures the underlying
purpose of advancing security interests at the expense not only of civil rights
and liberties, but our constitutional tradition. I argue that we should abandon
the image of balancing security against something so broad as "civil
liberties," take seriously our constitutional tradition's institutional design of
checks, balances, and suspicion of unilateral action, and encourage the widest
possible discussion of ways to harness both our pragmatist and constitutional

24. Id. at 39.
25. Posner and Vermeule write:
Consider the public letter signed by over 700 law professors on December 13, 2001,
just three months after the 9/11 attacks, that criticized an executive order establishing
rules for military tribunals in terrorism cases. This sort of civil-libertarianism, which
applies even when the emergency is red-hot and indisputable, is our principal target.

Id. at 44 (footnote omitted).
26. These are all arguments Posner and Vermeule attribute to civil libertarians who oppose
unilateral executive decisions that diminish or violate civil liberties. Id. at 6.
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traditions in order to create lasting structural solutions to the twin goals of
fostering liberty and providing security.
I.

Recalibrating the Scales: Is Trade-off Necessary?

Justifications for the use of torture, or more euphemistically, "coercive
interrogation, , 27 depend on accepting the principle that there is an appropriate balance between liberty and security that may include depriving
individuals of their human dignity by subjecting them to torture or cruel,
inhumane, or degrading treatment. Posner and Vermeule claim that "the
tradeoffthesis holds that governments should, and do, balance civil liberties
and security at all times" and that "[d]uring emergencies, when new threats
appear, the balance shifts" to favor security over liberty. 28 Accordingly,
much turns on the legitimacy and the scope of the trade-off thesis.
Posner and Vermeule offer no argument to justify the necessity of the
trade-off. They believe it is unlikely that in a modern liberal democracy,
governments will have failed to identify ways of increasing security without
burdening liberty. 29 Thus, there will be an unavoidable need to balance the
two in the form of a trade-off. Richard Posner presents a theory of judging,
at least at the constitutional level, in which judging proceeds "by balancing
the anticipated consequences of alternative outcomes and picking the one
that creates the greatest preponderance of good over bad effects." 30 One reason for thinking that liberty and security must be traded "is that without
physical security there is likely to be very little liberty." 3 1 This is undoubtedly true but perhaps proves too much. For of course, without existential
security there can be no commerce, no contracts to enforce, no exercisable
property rights, or quite simply, no life itself. But just because security is a
necessary condition for the operation of civil society does not in itself show
why it is the collection of rights called civil liberties that must unavoidably
be traded off to ensure that security.
A.

Trade-offs Are Not Inevitable

Neither project proffers arguments explaining why, after an increase in
security risk, redoubled efforts to use existing methods will not work just as
well as the automatic resort to a liberty-security trade-off. Posner and
Vermeule dismiss this consideration because they believe it implausible that
we are not ordinarily operating at a "Pareto frontier" with regard to the

27. Posner and Vermeule are interested in defending "coercive interrogation that (by virtue of
its severity) counts as torture or as cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment." Id. at 184.
28. Id. at 5.
29. Id. at 26.
30. POSNER, supra note 6, at 24.

31. Id. at 47. Posner and Vermeule also write that "[1]iberty cannot be enjoyed without
security, and security is not worth enjoying without liberty." POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3,
at 26.
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balance of security and liberty-that is, operating at a position in which
further gains in one value cannot be achieved without costs to the other.32
This belief ignores the fact that a Pareto frontier assumes a certain set of
background conditions that under conditions of emergency, as opposed to
times of normalcy, will change. Changed background conditions may alter
the relationship between security and liberty, thereby altering the shape of
the Pareto frontier and potentially providing new ways to improve both security and liberty without trade-offs. For example, background budget
restraints may be loosened as a result of a new political environment in the
wake of an emergency event. Moreover, because security can be purchased
at the expense of other goods, it is not clear why, in the aftermath of a terrorist attack, additional security must be purchased at the expense of liberty
alone.
Before an emergency develops, it may be infeasible to spend more on
airport security; after the emergency, greater expenditures may become not
only politically feasible but actually demanded by popular pressure. An easy
example of such changes in politics and opinion occurred after September
11, 2001, when increased funding for airport security became a budgetary
reality. 33 The tendency for events to alter budget priorities is a common feature of political life, illustrated also in the increased willingness of Congress
to allocate funds for New Orleans's levees after Hurricane Katrina. 34 Posner
and Vermeule argue that inflexible and principled protection for civil liberties will lead to less security than is optimal, but they assume in the process
that events do not alter the political calculus. It is more plausible, however,
to think that given an inflexible background rule prohibiting further erosions
of civil liberties, even if the cost of providing an optimal level of security
increases, political flexibility will prove at least as efficacious at meeting the
security needs as will seeking exceptions to the rule of law. In fact, in most
situations it is implausible to think otherwise. No doubt it will often be
cheaper and easier to diminish liberty to increase security, and thus as a contingent matter "[a]s threats increase, the value of security increases," and
"government will then trade off some losses in liberty for greater gains in
increased security., 35 But this trade-off depends on background rules,
political will, and the fact that shortcuts through liberty are usually cheaper
than more costly redoubled efforts that continue to respect existing levels of
liberty.

32. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 26-27.
33. See, e.g., Dean E. Murphy & Joel Brinkley, Rethinking the Security at Airports, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 19, 2001, at BI (reporting on the environment in which airport security budgets were
increased significantly).
34. See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews, Emergency Spending as a Way of Life, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2,
2005, § 3, at 4 (reporting on the $51.8 billion in emergency assistance appropriated following
Hurricane Katrina).
35. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 27.
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It is unlikely, however, that the costs of national security are unique in
this respect. Adhering to constitutional principles is often more expensive36
than employing incommunicado coercive interrogation on criminal suspects
or conducting random searches for contraband on mere hunches.37 Indeed,
when considering the forcible removal of evidence from a suspect's stomach
by the police, Justice Frankfurter stated that "[n]othing would be more calculated to discredit law and thereby to brutalize the temper of a society.' 3 8
"They are methods too close to the rack and the screw . .

. .39

Such is the

general price of constitutional commitments to principles over consequences.
Though from a consequence-only orientation, the rack and the screw may in
fact be far easier and more efficient.
Moreover, with regard to the necessity of balancing security and liberty,
both projects beg the central question. If one simply assumes that security
and liberty must be balanced, then it would seem to follow that they ought to
be balanced in order to maximize social welfare. After all, one ought to do
whatever one must to protect security. Two considerations undermine the
necessity of balance as each project presents it.
First, the real issues are about the nature and degree to which trade-offs
are appropriate under a constitutional commitment to the rule of law. Merely
asserting necessity does not make everything possible.40 Constitutional government must always act within constraints, whether the constraints are
constitutional, institutional, political, or practical. It is true that we make
many decisions under conditions of uncertainty. Though by contrast,
government does not ordinarily derogate from constitutional rights without
articulating specific reasons for doing so. One feature of judicially recognized derogations from constitutional rights is that the government be able to
justify its specific need along a continuum from rational reasons to compelling reasons and within limits in relation to the end sought on a continuum

36. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461 (1966) ("An individual swept from familiar
surroundings into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques
of persuasion... cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to speak."). Even if some methods
produce useful confessions more quickly, constitutional constraints remove them as options for
police. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 783-84 (2003) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("[A] functional equivalent of an attempt to obtain an involuntary confession
from a prisoner by torturous methods... [is the] type of brutal police conduct [that] constitutes an
immediate deprivation of the prisoner's constitutionally protected interest in liberty.").
37. In City of Indianapolisv. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000), the Court held that city roadblocks
for narcotics searches were unconstitutional because the Fourth Amendment requires individualized
suspicion under these circumstances, reasoning that "[w]e cannot sanction stops justified only by
the generalized and ever-present possibility that interrogation and inspection may reveal that any
given motorist has committed some crime." Id. at 44.
38. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173-74 (1952).

39. Id. at 172.
40. Richard Posner, by contrast, claims that "law must adjust to necessity born of emergency."
POSNER, supra note 6, at 158.

HeinOnline -- 86 Tex. L. Rev. 577 2007-2008

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 86:569

from reasonably related to narrowly tailored.4 1 Even if constitutional law has
a specifically "dynamic character," as Richard Posner suggests,42 especially
on the margins or in the "penumbra" of a constitutional right, it does not follow that there are not relatively fixed points of reference-core meaningsregarding the scope of constitutional rights. Aggressive questioning is one
thing; torture is quite another. In light of a strong tradition that views rights
as constraints not susceptible to utilitarian balancing, neither project provides
substantive arguments for why we should reject accounts of civil liberties
and rights as trumps 43 or side constraints that do not (always) answer to

consequentialist values, such as efficiency or necessity.
Second, as both projects admit, it is not clear how to calculate the tradeoffs, 44 and it is unclear what counts as maximizing social welfare in this

context. The "emergency" conditions that have given rise to the renewed
debate about emergency powers do not present an existential threat 45-a
security threat, no doubt, but not a threat to our very existence as a people
and a nation. Attacks of the kind we experienced on September 11 th are not
precursors to a potential invasion, as Pearl Harbor might have been, nor harbingers of potential annihilation, as the Cold War threatened. So if one is in
the messy world of marginal increases in security against nonexistential
threats, it becomes particularly unclear how trade-offs are to be calculated.
Apart from the assumption that security and liberty must be balanced, Posner
and Vermeule provide no arguments in support of standards of measurement
or means of calibrating the scales.46 Richard Posner admits that "the
'weighing' is usually metaphorical. The consequences judges consider are

41. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-36 (1996) (employing rational basis review);
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 201-02 (1995) (employing strict scrutiny); Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976) (developing intermediate scrutiny).
42. POSNER, supra note 6, at 40 ("The balancing approach that I am advocating to determining
the scope of constitutional rights in emergency circumstances highlights the dynamic character of
constitutional law ....
").
43. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, at xi (1977) ("Individuals have rights
when, for some reason, a collective goal is not a sufficient justification for denying them what they
wish, as individuals, to have or to do, or not a sufficient justification for imposing some loss or
injury upon them.").
44. Richard Posner writes, "It is true that in the present setting [the risks and harms] cannot be
quantified." POSNER, supra note 6, at 41. Posner and Vermeule are more cavalier: "An assumption
of the tradeoff thesis is that security and liberty are comparable ....
" POSNER & VERMEULE, supra
note 3, at 28.
45. Bruce Ackerman is right to argue that war rhetoric in the "war on terror" tends to obscure
the fact that unlike the U.S. Civil War or the threat of nuclear annihilation, which did present
existential threats, occasional, yet devastating and traumatic, attacks do not present a threat to our
existence as a nation: "We must distinguish, in short, between existential struggles, which threaten
utterly to destroy the polity, and momentary affronts to effective sovereignty, which don't." BRUCE
ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM

170-71(2006).
46. Posner and Vermeule simply state: "The claim that security and liberty trade off against one
another implies that respecting civil liberties often has real costs in the form of reduced security."
POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 24.
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imponderables, and the weights assigned to them are therefore inescapably
subjective. 47 I would argue that lack of clarity undermines the assumption
that liberty and security necessarily must be balanced, particularly since
Posner and Vermeule's method places a thumb on the side of security,
arguing as they do that in times of emergency, liberty must be diminished
and security augmented.
In short, neither project demonstrates why increased security threats
cannot be addressed through means that respect existing commitments to
principles of liberty and dignity. Resorting to an assumed necessity that liberty must be traded away in exchange for security obscures the more difficult
policy questions of how we might-through changed circumstances, political
will, and a sense of commitment-preserve existing liberty while increasing
security.
B. PreservingLiberties Does No Harm
At the extreme, as the increasingly old saw would have it, one must
preserve existence in order to have liberty. After all, as Richard Posner
makes clear in his book's subtitle, "While the Constitution protects against
invasions of individual rights, it is not a suicide pact. ' A 8 Even if this claim is
true, it does not follow that the Constitution is simply a guide to making
"pragmatic utility-maximizing decisions," as Posner would have it.49 Although the methodology of balancing remains opaque, Posner and Vermeule
assert that "[i]t is clear, however, that sometimes tangible security harms do
in fact occur when claims of civil liberties are respected."5 °
On inspection, the evidence to support such a proposition, that
respecting civil liberties leads to actual security harms, is either thin and
speculative or not relevant to any actual claim about civil liberties. First, as
evidence of harmful civil-liberties protections, Posner and Vermeule assert
that judicial implementation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act created a "wall" between intelligence and law enforcement in order to protect
civil liberties. 51 If it were not for that wall, they believe that "it is plausible
that" the 9/11 attacks would have been prevented.5 2 Of course, this is pure
speculation and ignores the causal role of other pathologies and operational

47. POSNER, supra note 6, at 24.
48. See POSNER, supra note 6, at v (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160
(1963)); see also Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("There is
danger that, if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will
convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.").
49. POSNER, supra note 6, at 41.
50. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 24. It may also be equally clear in some situations,
such as Japanese internment, that tangible harms to human dignity and liberty do in fact occur when
security claims are followed. Neither of these propositions tells us which value, security or liberty,
is more important in a given circumstance nor how we might decide the question of priority.

51. Id.
52. Id. at 25.
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problems. Second, Posner and Vermeule speculate that use of torture has
saved lives, though the specifics are quite slim.5 3 It may often be the case
that torture is a shortcut to results that can be achieved through other means
more respectful of human dignity and the rule of law. But the fact that shortcuts around the rule of law might produce desirable results does not
demonstrate that adherence to civil liberties produces actual security harms,
as Posner and Vermeule suggest. In addition, they assert that better screening techniques at airports might have impacted the 9/11 hijackers' plans.54
This conclusion, which was made by the 9/11 Commission,55 has in fact
wrought many significant changes in airport screening. 56 It is not at all clear,
however, why Posner and Vermeule would think that the ineffective airport
screening procedures that produced real security harms on 9/11 were caused
by excessive concern for civil liberties, rather than concern for economic
costs, or simply produced by human and institutional error and
incompetence. 7
Finally, in the most strained example meant to support the claim that
civil liberties protections cause security harms, Posner and Vermeule claim
that the general existence of free speech and press is "positively correlated
with greater transnational terrorism. '58 No doubt, it is a likely truism that
more open societies are more vulnerable to attack by outsiders than are
closed, authoritarian societies.5 9 But as an example of how civil liberties
trade off against security harms, citing the generalized freedom of speech is
unhelpful in the same way as citing the freedom of association and public

53. For example, Posner and Vermeule cite to an account of comments made by CIA Director
Porter Goss in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Id. at 25 & n.25. The
account noted that Director Goss "vigorously defended 'professional interrogation' as an important
tool in efforts against terrorism, saying that it had resulted in 'documented successes' in averting
attacks and capturing important suspects." Douglas Jehl, Questions Left by C.I.A. Chief on Torture
Use, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2005, at Al. That "professional interrogation" has been a useful tool in
averting attacks does not establish that those attacks could not have otherwise been prevented if
CIA officers had not engaged in torture.
54. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 25.
55. See NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT 392-98 (2004) (making recommendations for improvements in airport screening).
56. See, e.g., Eric Lipton & Christine Hauser, Screeners to Be Changed at U.S. Airports, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 14, 2006, at A18 (reporting that the Department of Homeland Security intended to
replace contractors who inspect passenger identification at airports with Transportation Security
Administration employees who would be trained in psychological profiling); Eric Lipton, US. to
Spend Billions More to Alter Security Systems, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2005, § 1,at 1 (indicating that
the federal government has spent $15 billion on airport screening since 2001 and will spend an
estimated $7 billion to upgrade screening equipment at airports and borders).
57. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 25.
58. Id. at 26.
59. Although research by Gary LaFree and Laura Dugan suggests that in recent years, mixed
regimes and partially democratic states have a higher risk of terrorist attacks and fatal terrorist
attacks than both authoritarian regimes and full democracies. Gary LaFree & Laura Dugan, Global
Terrorism and Democracy (Apr. 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Texas Law
Review).
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gathering-were it not for the existence of these freedoms, terrorists would
have no collective publics to target. Authoritarianism may always provide
for greater physical security than open societies. Such a claim is hardly a
reason to prefer authoritarian regimes and hardly evidence that protecting
civil liberties produces tangible security harms.
When thinking about the relation between security policy and civil
liberties, these kinds of vulnerabilities, stated in terms of generalized features
of the very existence of our civil society, are not the relevant kinds of considerations for the proposition that "security harms do in fact occur when claims
of civil liberties are respected., 60 Stated at this level of generality, it is likely
that "We the People" do suffer security harms through the very nature of who
we are as a people, but this does not present an opportunity for balancing
away our constitutive civil liberties because who we are as "We the People"
is not available for trade.
C. The Rhetoric of Balance
Because it goes to the heart of both projects, the image of balance is
worth returning to.- The rhetoric of balance itself is a source of much
confusion. 6' At first glance, the familiar image of Justitia, the ancient
goddess of justice, holding paired scales seems to indicate that balancing interests and arguments is inseparable from the rule of law. 62 The image of
Justitia is the image of weighing the relative merits of two sides of a single
issue. On balance, the arguments or evidence may weigh more on one side
of a single issue, providing a reason for rendering justice for that side. As a
result, balancing has the ring of familiarity. Courts frequently employ balancing tests when there are two competing interests, construed as a conflict
between individual right and state need.63 In cases like Mathews v.
Eldridge,64 the Court has regularly resorted to balancing tests in order to give

60. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 24.
61. See Jeremy Waldron, Security and Liberty: The Image ofBalance, 11 J. POL. PHIL. 191, 203
(2003) ("[W]hat I am trying to establish is the need for care with the idea of balancing.").
62. See Thomas P. Crocker, Envisioning the Constitution, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 27 (2007)
("Like the mechanics of paired scales, procedure provides the mechanics for fair outcomes through
the blind weighing of competing claims."); Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Images ofJustice, 96
YALE L.J. 1727, 1729, 1729-33 (1987) (describing the relationship of the "imagery of Justice" to
the problems of exercising judicial power); Thomas R. Kearns & Austin Sarat, Legal Justice and
Injustice: Toward a Situated Perspective, in JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE IN LAW AND LEGAL THEORY

1, 6, 6-7 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1996) (noting that Justitia, "the universal icon of
justice[,] ...is invariably associated with law").
63. For example, in upholding the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law, the Court noted that
"there has been a growing appreciation of public needs and of the necessity of finding ground for a
rational compromise between individual rights and public welfare." Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442 (1934).
64. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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effect to perceived competing interests.65 Most recently, the Court in Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld 66 turned to the familiar balancing test to establish limits to the
President's power to detain individuals on the strength of his unilateral declaration that they are enemy combatants. 67
States exercise power to provide security and pursue other policies
within constraints. Even authoritarian dictatorships must operate within
some forms of political, cultural, geographic, and geopolitical constraints. In
liberal democracies some of these constraints take the form of constitutional
precommitments to preserve and protect particular core rights and liberties.
These rights and liberties limit the domain over which officials may legitimately exercise power in pursuit of governmental policies. Some liberties
are subject to override on the state's showing of a compelling interest. For
example, the state can deviate from absolute protection of a right to equal
protection of the laws on the basis of race by demonstrating that its action is
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest. 68 With regard to other
rights as dear as free speech, there are situations in which the government is
justified in placing limits on the exercise of the right. 69 But other liberties are
not subject to override. As punishment for a crime, an individual cannot be
drawn and quartered, no matter how compelling the state's argument in support of imposing such punishment. If a punishment is cruel and unusual
under the Eighth Amendment, that is the end of the story. 70 So we might say

65. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J.
943, 1004 (1987) (discussing the history and theory behind balancing, and concluding that "[s]evere
problems beset balancing approaches to constitutional law").
66. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
67. The Court simply assumed the need to balance interests:
Striking the proper constitutional balance here is of great importance to the Nation
during this period of ongoing combat. But it is equally vital that our calculus not give
short shrift to the values that this country holds dear or to the privilege that is American
citizenship. It is during our most challenging and uncertain moments that our Nation's
commitment to due process is most severely tested; and it is in those times that we

must preserve our commitment at home to the principles for which we fight abroad.
Id. at 532 (plurality opinion). Of course, it remains utterly unclear what "our calculus" is or how to
employ it.

68. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333-34 (2003) (holding that race-conscious
admissions plans are narrowly tailored when race is used as a plus factor but not in the context of
admissions quotas).
69. Although individuals have a right to speak in public, the government may enact reasonable
time, place, and manner restrictions on that speech. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 791 (1989) ("[E]ven in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on
the time, place, or manner of protected speech .. "); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence,
468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) ("Expression, whether oral or written or symbolized by conduct, is subject
to reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions.").
70. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737 (2002) (holding unconstitutional the shackling of a
person to a "hitching post" because "[t]he unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain... constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment" (omission in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)); Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) ("[T]he primary concern of the drafters was to proscribe 'torture[s]' and
other 'barbar[ous]' methods of punishment." (alteration in original) (quoting Anthony F. Granucci,
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that state power expands and contracts in relation to individual liberties. But
does that mean that state power over security hangs in a balance opposite
liberties?
Similarly, the exercise of individual liberty is subject to expansion and
contraction as well. Conditions exist under which we do not recognize a
rights claim as legitimate. For example, we do not recognize the right of free
speech when it is exercised by picketing a private residence. 7' Moreover,
specific rights claims can apply to a greater or lesser extent depending upon
background conditions and circumstances. Particularly when we discuss the
nature of political and civil liberty, the notion of "liberty" can apply as a
matter of more or less. Having abandoned the state of nature, human liberty
is always constrained by limits imposed by the protections of and participation in civil society. How much liberty we give up from this hypothetical
state of pure liberty depends on the collective needs of civil society in providing order and stability. Liberty exists in relation to other values and
applies in situations where it is capable of diminishment.
Having recognized the two different ways in which the scope of state
power and individual liberty may coincide or alter in relation to each other, it
is not at all clear in what sense liberty in general ever hangs in the balance
against other specific values, such as security. That either liberty or state
power occupies all of the operational space in which policy objectives may
be pursued does not entail that liberty and the specific value of security are in
a relation of balance. And if they were, neither project has articulated what
is the common metric by which to measure their relative weight. It is more
accurate to say that there is a somewhat indefinite initial constitutional baseline of minimal levels of liberty and enumerated state power. This initial
position can be altered through the operation of normal politics, by supplying
reasons to a neutral arbiter, or through moments of profound constitutional
change.72 The Supreme Court's tiered scrutiny reflects the differing degrees
to which the Court, acting as the presumed neutral arbiter between state
power and individual liberty, subjects proffered reasons to critical
examination. Protecting national security is merely one reason the state
might advance to justify an expanded exercise of power. In the face of sufficient justification, particular liberties may give way. But notice, in the
national-security context, our Fourth Amendment-protected right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures itself already contemplates that

"Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishment Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REv. 839, 842
(1969))).
71. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 488 (1988) (upholding a regulation on picketing near a
private residence). We limit speech in other ways to avoid excess noise or invasion of the free
enjoyment of public places by others. See, e.g., Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 803 (upholding a
noise restriction).
72. See 2 BRuCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 15-25 (1998) (describing
Reconstruction and the New Deal as fundamentally transformative moments in American
constitutional development).
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some kinds of searches and seizures will be necessary-namely, those that
are reasonable. In contrast, derogations from freedom of speech and
assembly, rights not already framed in terms of reasonableness, often require
a much stronger showing of governmental need and a narrow range of application to be justified. In the name of security, some speech-that which is
"directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action" 73-may be proscribed. That specific kinds of
speech can be proscribed in order to provide security does not entail that
something so general as civil liberties must be balanced against the particular
value of security.
Balance is familiar, yet misleading. Although some rights may properly
be balanced against government need, some civil liberties are so fundamental
that it is simply inappropriate to balance them against state interests. My
right to my own life and person may make it inappropriate for the state to
balance my claim to life against social welfare or my right to bodily integrity
against particular invasive acts for purposes of obtaining information. Although it may be appropriate to balance some aspects of some particular civil
liberties (free speech and incitement to imminent lawless action), it is inappropriate to balance others (right to life and a purported need to engage in
extrajudicial killing). Accordingly, the devil is in the details as to whether,
when, and to what degree it is appropriate to balance specific liberties against
security. Beyond unsupported generalizations, inapposite examples, and
rank speculation, Posner and Vermeule's project in particular is short on
these important details.74
Richard Posner recognizes that "the balance between liberty and safety
must be struck at the margin. 75 More importantly, Posner recognizes that
marginal values depend upon the total value we afford to civil liberties.76
When those values are great, as the civil libertarian suggests, then it should
require a large change at the margin to effect a change in the overall structure
and application of the right. It is both a conceptual and an empirical matter
73. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 (1969) (per curiam).
74. Posner and Vermeule supply no argument to support their proposition that "[c]onstitutional
rules do no good, and some harm, if they block government's attempts to adjust the balance as
threats wax and wane." POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 31. As a general proposition, this
must be clearly false. Constitutional rules providing judicial review of unilateral executive action,
as in the case of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring), further the good of constraining the Executive within constitutional limits, especially
when the Executive is acting within the domestic sphere when claiming national emergency.
Moreover, other, nonsecurity-related constitutional rules, such as the requirement of bicameralism
and presentment for war funding, even if they block the Executive's "attempts to adjust the
balance," do no harm and in fact do much good in providing a check against unilateral
overreaching. To claim otherwise, Posner and Vermeule would have to convert counterfactual
hypotheticals about how the Executive might have acted if free from any constraint into positive
harms in the real world of action within constraint. As we will see infra, by contrast, harm occurs
when the Executive acts unilaterally outside of constitutional constraints.
75. POSNER, supra note 6, at 3 1.

76. Id. at 31-33.
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as to how we assess the core value of civil liberties in relation to public
safety, one that depends upon our overall commitments as a political body to
specific constitutional rights as background constraints. The apologists place
their finger on the scale supporting security, while the civil libertarians place
theirs on the side of rights and liberties. Who is right? Who is to decide?
Assuming that some more specific form of balancing or trade-off may be
required at the margin, what are the appropriate limits or restraints to making
the trade-off? These questions introduce the second thesis of both projects:
courts and Congress should defer to the policy choices of executive officials.
II.

Deference and the Two-Legged Stool

Both projects argue that because the judiciary is institutionally ill suited
to decide the questions of emergency and balance, we all (judiciary and informed publics) should defer to cooperative executive-legislative decision
making when available, and otherwise, we should defer to unilateral executive decisions. "[T]he deference thesis holds that the executive branch, not
Congress or the judicial branch, should make the tradeoff between security
and liberty. 7 7 Because judges have limited institutional capacity and
knowledge, Posner and Vermeule claim that "[i]n times of emergency,
judges should get out of the government's way," and if government chooses
78
badly, "judicial intervention may only make things worse, not better.,
To understand the radical nature of this thesis-that complete deference
is owed to the Executive during periods of claimed emergency-it is useful
to review some basic propositions about our constitutional structure. To
have a divided government of enumerated and limited powers means that
each division of governmental powers properly functions within limited,
albeit flexible and sometimes overlapping, spheres. In order to "secure the
Blessings of Liberty,, 79 constitutional structure was designed in order to pre80
vent the concentration of power within any one department of government.
Constitutional design embeds the belief that the surest route to tyranny is the
concentration of powers within a single branch of government. James
Madison's solution to the specter of concentrated government is our system
of separated powers, each operating to check and balance the other. As the
Court has noted many times, "IT]he Framers 'built into the tripartite Federal
Government... a self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or
77. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 5.
78. Id. at 12.
79. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
80. As the Court noted in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam):
The men who met in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 were practical statesmen,
experienced in politics, who viewed the principle of separation of powers as a vital
check against tyranny. But they likewise saw that a hermetic sealing off of the three
branches of Government from one another would preclude the establishment of a
Nation capable of governing itself effectively.
Id. at 121.
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aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other. ' 81 Moreover,
Madison reasoned that an additional facet of that "self-executing safeguard"
is that the interests of the person occupying the office should be isomorphic
with the interests of the office itself, thereby creating incentives to "resist
encroachments of the others. 82 We cannot always rely on wise leadership
because as Madison cautioned, "[e]nlightened statesmen will not always be
at the helm. 8 3 Efforts to prevent the possibility of tyranny through structural
solutions have not been interpreted by the Court to eliminate the flexible or84
ganization of government designed to serve the needs of the people.
Structural flexibility, however, is not boundless.8 5 It has a breaking point.
Both Richard Posner and Posner and Vermeule push the theme of governmental adaptability to security risks past the breaking point by advocating
absolute trust in executive-branch security policy, free from judicial review.
"The deferential view is that judicial review of governmental action, in
the name of the Constitution, should be relaxed or suspended during an
emergency. ' 86 Moreover, Posner and Vermeule claim that federal judges
"are amateurs playing at security policy, and there is no reason to expect
that
courts can improve upon the government's emergency policies in any systematic way." 87 Richard Posner, perhaps as a sitting judge himself, is more
circumspect about judicial review, though ultimately inclined to grant great
deference to executive action. Posner recognizes the limitations of institu88
tional competence that judges face by not being national-security experts.
When there exist different views of a given policy, Posner suggests that "it is

81. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 382 (1989) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 122).
82. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 321-22 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("[T]he
great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists
in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal
motives to resist encroachments of the others.").
83. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), supra note 82, at 80.
84. As Justice Jackson noted in concurrence in the Steel Seizure case, "While the Constitution
difuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the
dispersed powers into a workable government." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel
Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
85. Considering emergency-power claims in a very different context, the Court explained:
Extraordinary conditions may call for extraordinary remedies. But the argument
necessarily stops short of an attempt to justify action which lies outside the sphere of

constitutional authority.
Extraordinary conditions do not create or enlarge
constitutional power. The Constitution established a national government with powers
deemed to be adequate, as they have proved to be both in war and peace, but these
powers of the national government are limited by the constitutional grants. Those who
act under these grants are not at liberty to transcend the imposed limits because they
believe that more or different power is necessary.
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 528-29 (1935) (footnote omitted).
86. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 15 (emphasis omitted).
87. Id. at 31.
88. Posner states that a reason for a "light judicial hand" is that "[jIudges aren't supposed to
know much about national security; at least they don't think they are supposed to know much about
it." POSNER, supra note 6, at 37.
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unclear why a judicial perspective should rule, especially since judicially defined rights are only one check on executive overreaching., 89 Moreover,
focusing on the potential consequences of a decision, Posner concludes that
"when in doubt about the actual or likely consequences of a measure, the
pragmatic, empiricist judge
will be inclined to give the other branches of
90
government their head.

Posner and Vermeule's thesis retains a veneer of plausibility only
because they redescribe the purpose of judicial review. They repeatedly
claim that judicial review cannot improve upon national-security policy. 9 1
This claim may be true-although nowhere do they empirically support the
claim-but it is most certainly irrelevant to all but the most ardent defenders
of legal realism. Unless one is willing to claim that constitutional decisions
are always, or at least almost always, disguised policy preferences, then no
other theory of judicial review argues that it is a court's purpose to improve
upon the underlying governmental policy choices. Rather, as the Court likes
to remind us, "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." 92 Judicial review, in its most lofty
manifestation, translates constitutional text into constitutional law, policing
the boundaries of enumerated power in order to safeguard liberty. 93 If by
"improving upon national security policy," Posner and Vermeule mean that
courts would attempt to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of that
policy, nothing could be further from judicial purpose. In fact, it might be
fair to assume that constitutional constraints on government action designed
to protect civil rights and liberties are always less efficient and effective than
unconstrained action. 94 Constitutional protections for rights and liberties exist to channel government action, even to "stifle[] a social experiment" as
Richard Posner suggests,95 within constitutional boundaries. Courts do not
aim to help or hinder efficiency or effectiveness, but rather to articulate the

89. Id. at 36.
90. Id. at 27.
91. See, e.g., POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 89, 89-90 (arguing that during times of
emergency, the judiciary lacks the information with which to conduct detailed security-policy
review and the time in which to do so, and that the consequences ofjudicial invalidation of nationalsecurity policy may be "disastrous").
92. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see also Cooper v. Aaron, 358
U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (characterizing Marbury as having "declared the basic principle that the federal
judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever
since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our
constitutional system").
93. Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEXAs L. REv. 1165, 1173 (1993) ("The
translator's task is always to determine how to change one text into another text, while preserving
the original text's meaning.").
94. See, e.g., Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726-27 (1969) ("Nothing is more clear than
that the Fourth Amendment was meant to prevent wholesale intrusions upon the personal security of
our citizenry, whether these intrusions be termed 'arrests' or 'investigatory detentions."').
95. POSNER, supra note 6, at 27.
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background, and bedrock, constitutional constraints within which government must operate.
Of course, a tremendous amount of debate and disagreement exists over
precisely how the Court determines, or should determine, what constitutional
law is. 96 Judge Posner takes as an initial premise "that constitutional theory
is deeply subjective, providing therefore no solid guidance to Supreme Court
Justices and so leaving them to make up constitutional law as they go
along., 97 If Justices simply make things up, then perhaps we should downgrade their participation in government, especially in times of emergency.
After all, why should the subjective impressions of Supreme Court Justices
be allowed to stand in the way of the tough, consequence-minded, and
results-oriented decisions of the President? According to Posner, the
"pragmatic" judge will not stand in the way, at least "when in doubt about
the actual or likely consequences of a measure." 98 Pragmatic judges, among
whom Posner includes most of the current Justices, "base their decisions on a
balancing of anticipated consequences, ' 99 and by implication not solely on
what constitutional principle requires, regardless of the particular social or
political consequences.
These are radical suggestions and revisions of the institutional role of
the courts as guardians of liberty and constitutional structure. According to
more robust notions of judicial review of legislative action, judicial review
protects fundamental rights and liberties from unwarranted governmental
encroachment. Judicial review also patrols the separation of powers among
the branches of government and between the federal government and the
states. In the post-CaroleneProducts0 0 era, the Court has been particularly
keen to protect the rights of discrete and insular minority groups against the
encroachments of the majority, while giving a wide berth to legislative decisions that do not entrench such democratic failures.' 0 1 This view of judicial
role has been central to a particular model of the development of rightsprotecting jurisprudence in equal-protection, due-process, and First

96. On the Court itself, two competing views are offered in STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE
LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 7-12 (2005) and ANTONIN SCALIA, A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 37-38 (1997).

97. POSNER, supra note 6, at 26.

98. Id. at 27.
99. Id. at 28.
100. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
101. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, The Footnote, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 275, 298 (1989) (noting that by
protecting democracy "the judiciary properly may subject legislation to a higher level of scrutiny,

not because it is authorized to impose its value choices upon the majority, but because the process
itself is defective, undemocratic, impure"). But see Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 290 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (describing footnote four's rationale of protecting discrete
and insular minorities as having "never been invoked in our decisions as a prerequisite to subjecting
racial or ethnic distinctions to strict scrutiny").
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Amendment areas. ° 2 But this view of judicial review has also been highly
deferential, in particular to legislative action absent any democratic failure of
the kind that leads to the imposition of social costs and constraints on
minorities. Under this approach, the Court looks primarily to patrol the
broad boundaries of civil liberties and rights against unwarranted encroachments by the Legislative or Executive Branches. Even when such review
employs notions of balance, as it did in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,10 3 constitutional
principles and constraints play a fundamental role in limiting what constitutes acceptable forms of policy choices. Upholding principled limitations,
however, is a far cry from substituting judicial policy choices for executive
or legislative ones, which Posner and Vermeule suggest is the result of judicial review.
Posner and Vermeule reject the Carolene Products version of judicial
review, claiming it "comes unglued during times of emergency."' 4 The risk
of error is high because "[i]n times of emergency, the judges' information is
especially poor, their ability to sort justified from unjustified policies especially limited, and the cost of erroneously blocking necessary security
measures may be disastrous."' 0 5 In their view, judges should defer to executive decisions because the delay and uncertainty that would result from
judicial review produces untenable costs to executive power. Thus, they
conclude that "[i]n times of emergency, judicial deference is both desirable
and predictable, given the high stakes and the judges' limited information
and competence."' 1 6 The virulence of their criticism of judicial review seems
to stem from their conclusion that the risks and costs of mistakes are much
higher during emergencies than in normal times.
First, it is useful to note that Posner and Vermeule frequently fault civillibertarian arguments for being overly speculative when they are concerned
about democratic failure or the possibility that unfettered executive officials
will use emergencies as ways to garner greater power. It is difficult to see

102. See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 72, at 368-75 (discussing the role of Carolene Products in
initiating an alternative organizing framework for future legal development, including more
exacting judicial scrutiny of statutes denying basic political rights or exhibiting prejudice against
discreet and insular minorities). See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REvIEW (1980) (arguing for a robust view of the judiciary's role, including
the protection of minority rights). Ackerman has also been a critic of the narrow focus of protecting
only discrete minorities from legislative discrimination. Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene
Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 745 (1985) ("[T]o remain faithful to Carolene's concern with the
fairness of pluralist politics, we must... [attend to] the anonymous and diffuse victims of poverty
and sexual discrimination who find it most difficult to protect their fundamental interests through
effective political organization."); see also Owen M. Fiss, Foreword.- The Forms of Justice, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 (1979) (observing the limit of the footnote's view of judicial review to "two
instances of legislative failure: abridgement of the right to vote and victimization of a discrete and
insular minority").
103. 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (plurality opinion).
104. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 90.

105. Id. at 91.
106. Id.
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their claim that a judicial decision upholding a constitutional limit on unilateral executive action is potentially "disastrous" '10 7 as itself anything but
wildly speculative. As a matter of unilateral policy, the Bush Administration
has claimed the authority to detain U.S. citizens indefinitely without trial or
access to federal courts on the strength of its declaration that an individual is
an enemy combatant.' 0 8 When the Supreme Court held that unilateral power
to detain U.S. citizens indefinitely in this manner is antithetical to our system
of government, nothing potentially "disastrous" loomed on the horizon. Nor
were any disasters imminent when the Supreme Court held that the Executive
could not act outside of the Geneva Conventions in subjecting detainees to
military commissions it unilaterally established, operated, and reviewed.10 9
Upholding constitutional rights to minimal due process is hardly the stuff
supporting Posner and Vermeule's overwrought alarm and speculation concerning the prospect that judicial review of executive action will cause
security harms.
Second, Posner and Vermeule write that "[j]udges are generalists, and
the political insulation that protects them from current politics also deprives
them of information, especially information about novel security threats and
necessary responses to those threats," ' 1 0 and when judges or scholars criticize
executive policy, "they are amateurs playing at security policy, and there is
no reason to expect that courts can improve upon government's emergency
policies."'. In sum, "the problem is that the judges lack the competence to
evaluate those policies."'"1 2 This claim proves too much. One could
substitute "national industrial policy," for example, for "emergency policy"
in their sentence, and the same claim-that politics deprives courts of information leading to a lack of institutional competence-would lead to their
conclusion that there is "no reason to expect that courts can improve upon
government's" national industrial policies. This is a thesis broadly about the
role of judicial review packaged as a specific claim about judicial review of
executive action under claimed emergency. 13 I say "claimed emergency,"
for Posner and Vermeule allow no room for judicial review of the basis for
the Executive's claimed necessity to act on emergency powers. Despite reasonable fears that an unchecked Executive would use emergency situations to

107.
108.
Advisor
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 512 (relying on a declaration provided to the Court by the Special
to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to support the enemy-combatant designation).
See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 31 (footnote omitted).
Id.
Id. at 49.
Adrian Vermeule has defended a broader thesis about the limits of judicial review

elsewhere. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY

OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 230, 230-31 (2006) ("Judges should thus defer to legislatures on the
interpretation of constitutional texts that are ambiguous, can be read at multiple levels of generality,
or embody aspirational norms whose content changes over time with shifting public values.").
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aggrandize power, 114 Posner and Vermeule propose allowing the Executive
Branch to declare emergencies and to expand its power while shrinking constitutional protections for civil rights and liberties by removing judicial
review. Nothing could be further from our pragmatic constitutional tradition
than to trust one branch with such unrestrained conviction.
In a similar vein, Posner and Vermeule write: "The decision to infringe
on civil liberties for security purposes may be right or wrong, but it is no
more likely to be right or wrong than the quotidian decision to construct a
highway or to reduce funding for education."' 1 5 First, there is evidence to
suggest that emergency pressure to act makes mistakes more likely.
Japanese internment as well as the suppression of speech during both World
War I and the Red Scare have all been widely seen as mistakes after the
fact. 1 6 Second, Posner and Vermeule do not provide an empirical basis for
this assumption that the Executive is no more likely to get things wrong during an emergency than during normal times. Notice, however, that their
claim once again proves too much. If an executive decision to build a highway is equally likely to be wrong as a decision about security policy, then
isn't the usefulness of judicial review the same for the latter as it is for the
former? Posner and Vermeule respond that the cost of judges getting decisions wrong is much higher during emergencies than during normal times,
and therefore the role of judicial review is not the same. During normal
times we might get a wasteful highway project, or fail to get a needed
highway, if judges make wrong decisions, but matters could be far worse in
terms of loss of lives if judges err when reviewing security policy. While
this claim may be true, it is similarly true that individuals indefinitely
detained, tortured, or even killed, as well as governmental eavesdropping on
millions of citizens are huge costs if unchecked executive decisions lead to
the wrong policies. So Posner and Vermeule's "no more likely" claim seems
to be at best a wash. We thus return to their unwarranted assumption that the
Executive, without structural checks and acting unilaterally, will get things
right when acting under pressure of emergency situations.
Unilateral action under our constitutional system is an outlier. What the
apologists advocate is abandoning the conversational aspect of American
Constitutionalism in favor of the univocal voice of supposed executive

114. Bruce Ackerman expresses the concern in these terms: "If left to their own devices,
presidents will predictably exploit future terrorist attacks by calling on us to sacrifice more and
more of our freedom if we ever hope to win this 'war."' ACKERMAN, supra note 45, at 6.
115. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 30.
116. See generally DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL

FREEDOMS INTHE WAR ON TERRORISM 228, 228-29 (2003) (stating that governments overreact in
times of crisis and that "at some point after-and often long after-the emergency has passed, the
government's conduct is widely acknowledged to have been an overreaction"); GEOFFREY STONE,
PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH DURING WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR
ON TERRORISM 307 (2004) ("Over the years, Korematsu has become a constitutional pariah.").
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necessity during times of emergency.1 17 More than achieving some desirable
policy outcome, the conversational aspect of our constitutional tradition is
important to achieving enduring wisdom in constitutional decisions and
interpretations. 11 8 The pace or content of the conversation will undoubtedly
shift during emergencies or when considering issues of national security, but
that does not mean that there is, or should be, no conversation at all. Without
the process of questioning and criticism that occurs through conversation, we
are left with doubt about the results, and when it comes to higher lawmaking
functions, there is less legitimacy when there is a paucity of participation.
A conversation that includes dissenting voices is likely to lead to greater
decisional accuracy, avoiding the pitfalls of conformity and social cascades
in which similar voices reinforce a prevailing view.'1 19 I don't mean to imply
that judicial review is the equivalent of dissent. When, however, the
Executive is allowed to act with knowledge that it is free from any external
check, there will be a greater likelihood of mistakes born of too little information and too restrained a conversation over the best course of action.
Judicial review, in normal times no less than during times of nationalsecurity threat, functions as a check against extreme views becoming
prevailing orthodoxy. Especially during emotionally charged times, prizing
loyalty over competence and agreement over dissent leads one to doubt the
120
empirical accuracy of the claim that the Executive unilaterally knows best.
Our constitutional culture is one that profoundly distrusts unilateral policies.
What is most troubling about the deference thesis is that it proposes to
defer to the balancing decisions made by the very officials who have the
greatest interest in weighing matters heavily in favor of security over liberty.
Executive officials under public pressure to act to alleviate fears of additional
attacks have a tremendous incentive to develop new policies and practices
that at least have the appearance of increasing security; they have far less
incentive to promote civil liberties. Recall that the image of balancing is
most closely associated with the symbol of justice as a blind and neutral arbiter of competing claims. The Executive Branch is neither blind nor neutral

117. On reading the Constitution as a conversation, see LAWRENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C.
DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 31 (1991).
118. Sometimes this conversation is one carried on not only within but between generations.
See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 72, at 383-84 (describing an intergenerational conversation
concerning constitutional meaning and transformation); Bruce Ackerman, Why Dialogue?, 86 J.
PHIL. 5, 13 (1989) (arguing for a discursive political theory and engagement in a dialogue with the
history of liberal thought).
119. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 210-11 (2003) ("Organizations and
nations are far more likely to prosper if they welcome dissent and promote openness.").
120. Cass Sunstein claims "that the probability of harm is often neglected when people's
emotions are activated, especially if people are thinking about the worst-case scenario." Cass R.
Sunstein, ProbabilityNeglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61, 105 (2002). It
is the Executive's job to think about the worst-case scenario, often in an emotionally charged
atmosphere. Without wider consultations and institutional checks, especially when suppressing
civil rights and liberties, executive decisions risk getting policy wrong.
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when it comes to balancing security and liberty. Justice Souter in his concurrence in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld makes a similar point in terms of separated
powers:
In a government of separated powers, deciding finally on what is a
reasonable degree of guaranteed liberty whether in peace or war (or
some condition in between) is not well entrusted to the Executive
Branch of Government, whose particular responsibility is to maintain
security. For reasons of inescapable human nature, the branch of the
Government asked to counter a serious threat is not the branch on
which to rest the Nation's entire reliance in striking the balance
between the will to win and the cost in liberty on the way to victory;
the responsibility for security will naturally amplify the claim that
security legitimately raises.121
If the image of balance is to be taken seriously at all, the deference
thesis must be abandoned. As the plurality in Hamdi made clear, "Whatever
power the United States Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy organizations in times of conflict,
it most assuredly envisions
a role for all three branches when individual lib' 22
stake."'
at
are
erties
Deference to unilateral executive decisions affecting constitutional
rights and liberties, endorsed through legislative silence or acquiescence,
produces the instability of a two-legged stool, the structural defects of which
should by now be obvious.
III. The Only Thing We Have to Fear Is...
According to Posner and Vermeule, any claim by civil libertarians that
government functions worse during an emergency depends on variations of
three different theories: (1) the "panic theory," which suggests that during
emergencies executive officials will overestimate the security threat,
excessively impose costs on liberty, and act irrationally;123 (2) the
"democratic failure theory," which presents an account of a government that
seeks to achieve gains in security for a majority at the expense of political or
121. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 545 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Jackson
articulated the problem in this way:
But no doctrine that the Court could promulgate would seem to me more sinister and
alarming than that a President whose conduct of foreign affairs is so largely
uncontrolled, and often even is unknown, can vastly enlarge his mastery over the
internal affairs of the country by his own commitment of the Nation's armed forces to
some foreign venture.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 642 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
122. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536 (plurality opinion); see also Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934) ("[The war power] permits the harnessing of the entire energies
of the people in a supreme cooperative effort to preserve the nation. But even the war power does
not remove constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties.").
123. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 59.
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ethnic minorities;124 and (3) the "ratchet theory," which observes that once
government succeeds at aggrandizing power during emergencies, it will retain large vestiges of that power when the situation normalizes, leading over
time to ever-increasing centralized authoritarian power.1 25 Posner and
Vermeule spend much of their book rejecting all three theories of
governmental malfunction during emergencies.
Moreover, Posner and
Vermeule argue that civil libertarians appeal to these arguments because of
the weakness of straightforward rights arguments.126 In short, because it is
constitutionally acceptable in some cases to balance rights claims against
governmental needs, civil libertarians cannot rely on arguments seeking absolute protection of rights, especially not rights against torture under
potentially "catastrophic" conditions. What unites these arguments is the
common speculative inversion of our constitutional tradition in which civil
libertarians, not authoritarian government or even terrorists, become the real
threat to the nation.
A. Panic and DemocraticFailure
One argument often made against unilateral executive action is that
executive officials not only have incentive to overreact but have the cognitive
tendency to do so. The fear of additional attacks, the fear of public reprisal,
and the need to assuage public fears all lead to strong motivations to provide
security with little regard for liberty. Thus, as Justice Souter's Hamdi concurrence suggests, to place responsibility for balancing liberty and security in
the biased hands of executive officials who have the strongest motive 127to
promote security policy without regard to civil liberties is perverse at best.
Yet Richard Posner finds little to recommend such arguments, and
Posner and Vermeule not only reject the very basis for such concerns but
argue that even if true, there is nothing courts could do to improve the
situation. 128 Under their argument, even if abuses happen, they are
inevitable, and courts should not intervene because they risk making matters
worse. In full, Posner and Vermeule's argument is that fear does not distort
emergency decision making, at least no more so than normal decision
making, but even if fear did have greater effects during emergencies, courts
cannot help the situation because among other problems, it is unclear
whether fear would lead to measures designed to increase security or to protect liberty.

124. Id. at 87.
125. Id. at 131-32.
126. See id. at 40 ("Few civil libertarians really want to defend an absolutist view of rights as
side constraints .... ).
127. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 545 (Souter, J., concurring).
128. See POSNER AND VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 94 ("Courts cannot systematically improve
upon government's first-order balancing of security and liberty.").
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Where civil libertarians point to security panics, Posner and Vermeule
29
note that civil libertarians are just as prone to panics over lost liberty.'
Moreover, liberty panics have the vice of potentially leaving us in a
vulnerable security position by depriving executive officials of the freedom
from constitutional constraint they need in order to provide pragmatic solutions to dynamic security threats. Thus, on their view, we should really fear
civil-libertarian panic because it might leave us vulnerable to attack.
Moreover, according to Posner and Vermeule, progressive social change is at
least as likely to occur during emergencies as is democratic failure. 30 Unchecked authoritarian action can actually be the engine of progressive social
change.
The contrast between these two ways of seeing-the civil libertarian
and the apologist-is most stark in this discussion. Where civil libertarians
see serious problems with executive abuse, the apologists either see no abuse
or see any abuse as a necessary complement to emergencies that should be
optimized. 131 Where civil libertarians point to historic abuses, such as
Japanese internment, the apologists see potentially justified actions, and
where there is disagreement, "both the civil libertarian commentators and the
judges lack the necessary expertise"' 132 to determine whether the decision was
necessary for security. Where civil libertarians find examples of social oppression of minorities and dissenters, upheld by the Court in cases like
Debs 133 and Korematsu,134 the apologists find engines of progressive social
change during emergencies, such as the Emancipation Proclamation during
the Civil War and desegregation during the Cold War.' 35 The apologists find
reasons to doubt the existence of any democratic-failure effects and then
conclude that there is no evidence that democratic failure occurs more often
during emergencies or that minorities will be more likely to be targeted during emergencies than during nonemergencies. 36 They simply shift the
burden of persuasion onto the civil libertarian and then positively conclude
that there is no reason to think there is a potential problem of democratic
failure.
As it turns out, civil-libertarian constitutional constraint is just as much
an object of fear as the security threats themselves, at least for those who
think that "[c]onstitutional law is especially plastic.' 37 Fear becomes a repeating motif in both projects. Posner and Vermeule recite a parade of
129.
security
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See id. at 77 ("Nothing in the mechanisms of panic suggests any systematic tilt toward
panics, as opposed to libertarian panics.").
Id. at 108.
Id.
Id. at 113.
Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 114.
Id. at 114-15.
POSNER, supra note 6, at 151.
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potential horribles if judges were to intervene to uphold constitutional constraints on executive decision making.13 8 Richard Posner argues that terrorist
threats require unfettered flexibility in responsive measures because "terrorist
leaders may even now be regrouping, and preparing an attack that will produce destruction on a scale to dwarf 9/11., 139 In the apologists' hands,
"[f]ear, though, plays a valuable role,"' 40 one that is meant to displace a traditional fear of authoritarian assaults on liberty with a new fear of the tenderminded civil libertarian.
B. Ratchets
One issue regarding increasing the Executive's emergency powers is
that power once granted may become difficult to relinquish. Emergency
measures adopted to deal with exceptional circumstances may become normalized in everyday domestic law. 14 1 Moreover, if we imagine a series of
emergencies, each one requiring ever-more repressive responses from government officials, we can tell a bleak story of shrinking civil liberties in the
face of ever-increasing authoritarian power. 142 As Justice Jackson forcefully
noted, in the extreme, emergency decisions granted the imprimatur of a constitutional ruling will become normalized and remain "like a loaded weapon
ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim
of an urgent need. Every repetition imbeds that principle
more deeply in our
143
law and thinking and expands it to new purposes.
There are two related concerns here. One is that with each new attack,
new repressive measures will be enacted before the old ones expire, creating
a ratchet effect of ever-increasing and ever-more-intrusive security measures.
A second is that through this process emergency conditions will become
normalized. Yesterday's emergency measure will become tomorrow's normal procedure, especially when tomorrow brings new emergency measures
designed to counteract the latest terrorist threat.
One example of the process of building upon prior emergency powers,
stemming from Supreme Court decisions, is the use the Bush Administration
138.
139.
140.
141.

POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 88-89.
POSNER, supra note 6, at 148.
POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 76.
See Gross, Chaos and Rules, supra note 5, at 1092, 1090-95 ("The farther we get from the

original situation that precipitated its enactment, the greater are the chances that the norms and rules
incorporated therein will be applied in contexts not originally intended.").
142. Bruce Ackerman tells the story well:
A downward cycle threatens: After each successful attack, politicians will come up
with a new raft of repressive laws that ease our anxiety by promising greater securityonly to find that a different terrorist band manages to strike a few years later. This new
disaster, in turn, will create a demand for more repression, and on and on. Even if the
next half-century sees only three or four attacks on a scale that dwarf September 11,
the pathological political cycle will prove devastating to civil liberties by 2050.
ACKERMAN, supra note 45, at 2.
143. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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has made of the World War II-era holding in Ex parte Quirin.' There the
Court upheld the detention and trial before military commissions of six Nazi
saboteurs as enemy combatants, one of whom, Herbert Haupt, was a U.S.
citizen. 45 The Court reasoned that the President was acting within his
constitutional powers and under the direction of Congress in trying the
saboteurs as enemy combatants before military tribunals. 46 Having decided
to detain hundreds of individuals in indefinite detention at Guantanamo Bay
and having designated those individuals "enemy combatants," the Bush
Administration, using this precedent, 147 argued to near success that the
Executive has unchecked unilateral authority to detain individuals, including
U.S. citizens, he deems "enemy combatants" in the war on terror. In Hamdi,
the Court upheld this authority, subjecting it only to the limited judicial
detained individuals access to some due process to concheck of providing
1 48
test their status.
In holding that the President's action was lawful, however, the Court in
Exparte Quirin made clear that the "President, like the courts, possess[es] no
power not derived from the Constitution."'' 49 One implication of this cautionary note is that the President cannot conduct free-wheeling balancing of
security and liberty interests unmoored from congressional authorization or
constitutional authority. Moreover, the Court in Hamdi emphasized the fact
that "[w]e have long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank check
for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation's citizens.' 50 Despite these judicially enforced limitations on executive power, by declaring
national necessity under emergency conditions, the Executive was able to use
old precedents to extend its power to detain U.S. citizens indefinitely by providing some minimal opportunity for the individual to contest his designation
as an enemy combatant.
Although the factual circumstances recited several times by the plurality
15
in Hamdi concerned individuals detained on the battlefield in Afghanistan,'
the President's authority has not been limited to those circumstances. Regarding Jose Padilla, a U.S. citizen detained at Chicago's O'Hare airport
under a material-witness warrant and later designated an enemy combatant,
the Fourth Circuit held that the President had authority under both the

144. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
145. Id. at 20, 48.
146. Id. at 41-45.
147. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 569 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 536-38 (plurality opinion). The Administration had argued that the Court lacked
jurisdiction to consider habeas petitions from Guantanamo detainees. The Court rejected this
position, holding that federal courts had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to hear the
detainees' claims. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004) (plurality opinion).
149. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25.
150. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536.
151. Id. at 523.
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Authorization for Use
of Military Force (AUMF) and Hamdi to so designate
52
and detain Padilla.1
Even if the holdings of these cases are highly deferential to the
Executive, Posner and Vermeule nonetheless argue that the judiciary should
not be in the business of reviewing executive decisions concerning nationalsecurity policy. 153 One thing to note, however, is that even if the civil
libertarian is inclined to disagree with the deferential holdings of Hamdi and
Padilla,the Executive's actions have greater legitimacy because of the presence of judicial review. Moreover, judicial review remains available to
check executive abuse, which has plausibly occurred in the case of Ali Saleh
Kahlah al-Marri, who was taken from his home in Peoria, Illinois, and has
been held as an enemy combatant on the President's order since June 2003.
In this case, where there is an absence of any stated connection whatsoever to
the battlefield or having taken up arms against the United States, the Fourth
Circuit held that "the President lacks power to order the military to seize and
indefinitely detain al-Marri.' 54 Thus, an acceptance of executive power in
one situation occasions further assertions of that power in other situations.
With each successive assertion, we experience the accretive creep of an everwidening exercise of executive power and the prospect of an ever-decreasing
realm of personal liberty. That prospect is checked only by civil-libertarian
concerns and judicial review-two participants in our constitutional culture
155
that the apologists seek to eliminate from national-security considerations.
A further example stemming from Supreme Court decisions illustrates
the accretive process by which principles that grant power in one situation
have a tendency to spread to other situations. What has become known as
the special-needs exception to the ordinary warrant-and-probable-cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment 156 began with the special situation of
border-patrol agents conducting searches of cars for illegal aliens near the
border with Mexico. 157 That special circumstance has now spread to include
159
158
checkpoints for information gathering,
highway sobriety checkpoints,
drug testing of student athletes, 160 and most recently, random searches of

152. Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 397 (4th Cir. 2005).
153. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 18.
154. Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 164 (4th Cir. 2007).
155. See generally Owen Fiss, The War Against Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 26 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 235, 235 (2006) (describing how the Supreme Court's rulings in three cases regarding

detainment of individuals for years without charging them with a crime "badly compromised" basic
constitutional principles).
156. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("Only in
those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to
substitute its balancing of interests for that of the Framers.").
157. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 562, 566 (1976).
158. Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990).
159. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426-28 (2004).
160. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653-54, 664-65 (1995).
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bags in the New York subway system.161 In each case, the special need is
justified by circumstances that purport to make necessary the searches and
temporary seizures employed by state officials. In the New York-subway
context, the court engaged in a balancing test in which the liberty interest
never made an appearance.1 62 Rather the court reasoned by analogy from
existing practices of airport searches, accepting without question the assertions made by law-enforcement officials concerning the need for random
searches. The court stated, "We have no doubt that concealed explosives are
a hidden hazard, that the Program's purpose is prophylactic, and that the
nation's busiest subway system implicates the public's safety. Accordingly,
preventing a terrorist from bombing the subways constitutes a special
need" 163 justifying the program of random searches.
It is only one more step to allow for random searches of individuals on
the nation's busy sidewalks as pedestrians or the nation's busy streets as
drivers.164 Under this rubric, in which law-enforcement claims are not subject to question, and when there may always be a potential security threat
from concealed explosives (especially if we imagine a series of additional
terrorist attacks over a number of years), then random searches would be justified as part of our everyday public lives. We move from a point of specific
special need in a limited context by accretive creep to a special need in a
general context. What was special becomes normalized. The argument here
is not constructed to run headlong into the slippery-slope fallacy. Distinctions can be made between public transport and public sidewalks. But the
problem is that distinctions will not be made in order to protect specific liberty interests if the act of balancing always presupposes that liberty must give
way to relatively unquestioned assertions of executive officials concerning
necessity and special need. The apologists make this presupposition.
In contrast to these kinds of actual and potential abuses arising from
deference to the Executive during purported emergency situations, Posner
and Vermeule boldly transpose the source of potential danger. Contrary to
the traditional supposition, unilateral authoritarian executive action is not a
concern. 65 Rather, civil-libertarian constraints create the real danger of
creating undesirable ratchets. "Civil libertarians are the ratcheters, insisting
that every increase in civil liberties should be treated as a platform for further
161. MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 2006).
162. Id. at 271-73.
163. Id. at 271.
164. So far, the Court has rejected the practice of random automobile searches on ordinary
streets. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (affirming a decision by Judge
Posner who concluded the practice was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment); see also
Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F.3d 659, 663 (7th Cir. 1999) ("When urgent considerations of the
public safety require compromise with the normal principles constraining law enforcement, the
normal principles may have to bend. The Constitution is not a suicide pact. But no such urgency
has been shown here.").
165. In fact, Posner and Vermeule claim that Justice Jackson's Korematsu dissent rests "on a
simple empirical conjecture" that "seems hysterical." POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 137.
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increases. '' 166 On this view, if courts were to follow the directions of civil
libertarians, we would have increased protection for civil liberties at the expense of security. Moreover, because "the balance between security and
liberty is constantly readjusted as circumstances change," Posner and
Vermeule conclude that "a government that refuses to adjust its policies has
simply frozen in the face of the threat. It is pathologically rigid, not
enlightened, and that rigidity is at least as great a threat to national values or
to the nation's existence." 167 The civil-libertarian pathology gets even more
bizarre under Posner and Vermeule's account, as they declare that "[n]o nation preserves liberty atop a stack of its own citizens' corpses, but if one did,
it would not be worth defending. 1 68 By valuing civil rights and liberties, and
by sometimes providing structural limitations on the methods and options
government has in implementing policies, even security policies, the civil
libertarian has become the real danger to the state, pathologically rigid and
unenlightened, and willing to stand on principle atop a stack of corpses.
Whatever else one might say for Posner and Vermeule's line of
reasoning here, it is most surely fantastic. 169 It is also revealing. For in this
discussion, the image of balance becomes a rhetorical trope to mask a deeper
commitment of their project: to push normative justifications for providing
ever-greater security measures while limiting and displacing protections for
civil rights and liberties. There is no choice among weights and measures in
this balancing, only normative justifications for security policies, such as
torture, indefinite detentions, and warrantless wiretapping, that infringe on
our commitments to civil rights and liberties. If one has an active agenda in
promoting unilateral executive power to pursue national-security measures
under the rubric of "necessity," only then does it become possible to see civil
libertarians as threats to the achievement of a desired end, rather than as
interlocutors in a constitutional conversation that truly seeks to optimize both
liberty and security.
Here we see the limitation of these projects, both with regard to
premises and conclusion. If one is inclined to take a principled position
regarding civil liberties, then from the outset neither project presents persuasive arguments, certainly not for the presumed validity of balancing civil
liberties against national security. 170 In defending their project, and in
criticizing civil libertarians, Posner and Vermeule's arguments rely on

166. POSNER, supra note 6, at 45.
167. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 155.

168. Id.
169. As if to highlight the inverted nature of their project, the civil libertarian becomes the
threat, figuratively displacing the terrorist threat. The terrorist harm is held as a constant value, and
when the terrorist strikes, the changing variable that represents the most harm becomes the civil
libertarian.
170. For example, if security is a social good, then if one accepts John Rawls's theory of
justice, the lexical priority of liberty "means that liberty can be restricted only for the sake of liberty
itself." JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 214 (rev. ed. 1999).
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burden-shifting strategies and frequently replace argument with statements
that "there is no reason to think" the oppositional claim has any merit. For
example, regarding judicial review of executive action during emergencies,
they assert that "there is no general reason to think that judges can do better
than government at balancing security and liberty during emergencies.'' 7 1
Of course, as a semantic matter, that is clearly false in every instance in
which purported civil libertarians have advanced any reason to think their
position is correct. As a rhetorical matter, it supplants the argumentative
burden Posner and Vermeule's project bears with mere aspersion.
Presumably, the goal is to leave the impression that civil libertarians are
simply unreasonable. Indeed, in their hands, civil-libertarian positions are
"ignorant; many are also irrational, even hysterical."' 172 Other civil libertari174
173
propose "gimmicky and infeasible"'
ans have a "cartoonish vision,"'
solutions to balancing problems, make "delusion[al]" claims, 75 and present
"mystifying" theories. 176
Through the dichotomy of values they construct-the supposed
opposition between civil liberties and national security, which forms the
basis for the necessity of balancing-they figure an opposition between civil
libertarians and executive officials acting as national-security experts. When
the theory gets embodied, we learn that their project does not entail an open
dialogue between civil libertarians and national-security experts (as if these
are necessarily different kinds of persons) on the model of genuine
balancing. Rather, the one figure, the civil libertarian, is cast as the genuine
threat to national security, prone to panic and ripe for creating dangerous
ratchets. In the end, they reveal a jolting authoritarian sympathy, at home
with the suppression of dissenting speech and at odds with a constitutional
culture of inclusive pragmatic participation.
IV. Torture, Trade-offs, and Deference in Practice
When it comes to practical application of the trade-off-and-deference
methodology, the results are straightforward, and the discussion is sustained
only through the caricature of civil-libertarian positions. Both projects
171. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 31; see also, e.g., id. at 30 ("There is no reason to
think that the government will systematically undervalue civil liberties or overvalue security during
emergencies nor that it will systematically overestimate the magnitude of a threat, compared to its
behavior during non-emergencies."); id. at 60 ("There is no reason to think that the government will
systematically undervalue civil liberties .... "); id. at 88 ("[There is] no theoretical reason to
believe[] that democratic failure is more likely in emergencies."); id. at 159 ("Courts have no reason
to demand a more elaborate statutory mechanism governing emergency powers .. "); id. at 274
("There is no reason for officials or interested publics to afford their arguments special weight as
philosophical argumentation .
.
172. Id. at 79.
173. Id. at 202, 201-02.
174. Id. at 274.
175. Id. at 195.
176. Id. at 256.
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advance apologies on behalf of practices such as coercive interrogation and
torture, indefinite detention and trials by military commissions, as well as
domestic surveillance and suppression of dissent. 17 7 Although neither project
purports to provide apologies on behalf of specific Bush Administration
policies, as it turns out, both do. Posner and Vermeule explicitly disavow
any expertise: "We should be clear that we do not endorse or criticize any
particular counterterrorism measure used by the Bush administration. One of
our central points is that we, as lawyers, do not know enough about the underlying variables to be able to express an informed opinion ... ,,171 Such
demurrals aside, they proceed to express many opinions. Posner is more explicit in endorsing specific Bush Administration policies, such as indefinite
detention, warrantless domestic wiretaps, and coercive interrogation. 79 He
concludes "that the measures taken in the wake of the 9/11 attacks to combat
the terrorist threat do not violate the Constitution."' go
A.

Torture
Both projects endorse the practice of coercive interrogation. Posner and
Vermeule endorse both cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, as well as
torture. 11 Posner endorses both as well but prefers to have torture practiced
outside of any formal legal regime, as an exceptional practice warranted by

177. See POSNER, supra note 6, at 65 (arguing that there is constitutional support for the
indefinite detention of suspected terrorists, who should be treated as prisoners of war, not criminals
entitled to habeas corpus rights); id. at 74-75 (concluding that habeas corpus is not offended if a
suspected terrorist is tried before a military tribunal, so long as the right to challenge one's status as
a terrorist is allowed to be made before a civilian court); id. at 80 (stating that there is no
constitutional prohibition on the use of coercive interrogations and supporting the proposition that
as the value of the information sought increases, so should the level of coercion allowed in
interrogation); id. at 99-100 (asserting that if the information gathered in the course of surveillance
could only be used in the national-security context, then the government could constitutionally
intercept all electronic communications regardless of the citizenship of the individuals involved or
the domestic or international nature of the transmission); id. at 113, 113-14 (arguing for intensive
surveillance, including the physical presence of government operatives, of "radical imams");
POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 16, 15-16 (explaining that the "deferential view" of
constitutional law in national emergencies includes curtailing dissent if dissent would "weaken[]
resolve"); id. at 81, 80-81 (asserting that it is "hardly clear" the National Security Agency's
monitoring of international communication is "illegal at all"); id. at 214-15 (suggesting the need for
a legal framework that would allow for coercive interrogations in some circumstances and provide
for oversight); id. at 254-56 (criticizing the plurality in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004),
for its unwarranted concern with the issue of whether or not Hamdi's detention as a suspected
terrorist would last for his entire life); id. at 257 (hypothesizing that in giving the Executive its
proper deference in handling emergency situations, the U.S. Supreme Court may hold that military
tribunals of enemy combatants fully satisfy due-process requirements).
178. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 158.
179. See POSNER sources cited supra note 177.
180. POSNER, supra note 6, at 151.
181. See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 207-15 (discussing a legal framework for
torture). Under their deferential approach to unreviewable executive action, it appears that "the
Constitution licenses the President to be 'torturer in chief."' Harold Hongju Koh, Can the President
Be Torturer in Chief?, 81 IND. L.J. 1145, 1151 (2006).
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exceptional circumstances. 18 Both projects thus stand opposed to a growing
83
chorus criticizing coercive interrogation practices, at home and abroad. 1
Posner analyzes the constitutional implications of torture in terms of
Fifth Amendment-due-process jurisprudence. 184 Under this approach, one
cannot be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
Abusive practices such as torture would constitute deprivations of liberty
without due process of law.' 85 Using a 1952 Supreme Court decision involving the involuntary pumping of a criminal suspect's stomach in which the
Court concluded that such a practice "shocks the conscience,"' 186 Posner suggests that whether a practice would undermine our conception of ordered
liberty sufficient to create a violation of due process depends on the
circumstance. 187 It is a quick route to imagine the ticking-bomb scenario. A
bomb set to go off in a city where it will undoubtedly kill thousands; a suspect in custody who knows where the bomb is located. Time is ticking.
What do you do? Do you respect the suspect's civil liberties or resort to any
means necessary to obtain the information? Posner concludes that "[i]f it is
dire enough and the value of the information great enough, only a die-hard
civil libertarian will deny
the propriety of using a high degree of coercion to
' 88
elicit the information."'
Eschewing the need to resort to ticking-time-bomb hypotheticals,
Posner and Vermeule conclude that coercive interrogation is no different

182. See POSNER, supra note 6, at 85 (favoring the continuation of the ban on torture and
relying on its use only where "public officers ... perceive and act on a moral duty that is higher
than their legal duty").
183. See, e.g., MARK DANNER, TORTURE AND TRUTH: AMERICA, ABU GHRAIB, AND THE WAR
ON TERROR 22 (2004) (reporting on official decisions that had the effect of transforming "the
United States from a nation that did not torture to one that did"); Koh, supra note 181, at 1167
(concluding that the president cannot authorize torture in violation of congressional statutes orjus
cogens international norms, even "in the gravest national circumstances"); Seth F. Kreimer, Too
Close to the Rack and the Screw: ConstitutionalConstraints on Torture in the War on Terror, 6 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 278, 294-95 (2003) ("Torture is alien to our Constitution both because it impinges
on bodily integrity, and because it assaults the autonomy and dignity of the victim."); Christopher
Kutz, Torture, Necessity and Existential Politics, 95 CAL. L. REV. 235, 275 (2007) (arguing that
attempts to justify torture confuse different definitions of necessity and ignore long-standing human
rights that predate modem governmental institutions); David Sussman, What's Wrong with
Torture?, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 1, 3 (2005) (arguing that a unique moral aspect of torture separates
torture from other types of violence and causes it to always be "morally objectionable"); Jeremy
Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudencefor the White House, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681,
1717 (2005) ("[T]he rule against torture plays an important emblematic role so far as the spirit of
our law is concerned."); David Cole, How to Skip the Constitution, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 16,
2006, at 20, 21 (criticizing Posner and arguing that "[clonstitutional theory... demands more than
mere ad hoc balancing").
184. POSNER, supra note 6, at 80-85.
185. Id. at 80.
186. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
187. See POSNER, supra note 6, at 85 ("What shocks the conscience depends on circumstances.
In life-and-death situations the use of even highly coercive methods of interrogation is unlikely to
shock the conscience of most people, even thoughtful and humane ones.").
188. Id. at 81.
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from other practices that require first-order balancing of costs and benefits,
whether one is thinking in terms of catastrophic circumstances or other potentially harmful ones. Coercive interrogation "is not special at all" because
it is no different than other kinds of harms that executive officials are allowed to inflict, such as the use of deadly force.189 Richard Posner broadly
agrees with this point, noting that it is odd that we would allow executions
but seek to forbid the lesser harm of mere torture. 190 Accordingly, "the legal
system should authorize coercive interrogation in some narrow range of
circumstances, suitably defined and regulated ex ante." 1 91
What justifies such a cavalier conclusion, given that torture violates
domestic, international, and U.S. constitutional law? 192 The short answer is
"simple application of the tradeoff thesis."'' 93 During emergencies, the moral
harms of torture decline as the informational benefits rise. As the benefits
increase, the justifications for the practice increase as well.
Having divided the moral landscape between absolutists and
consequentialists, the apologists are not concerned with any of the moral
details that remain unresolved, even assuming a consequentialist moral
theory. Chief among the unresolved matters is any account for why security
should so consistently have a value greater than that of liberty or other civil
rights. Civil libertarians can tell a story about the intrinsic worth of
protecting human dignity and liberty in the face of state power and can also
tell a story about the consequences of failing to protect these values. Part of
the latter story is embedded in our constitutional tradition, which seeks to
limit and check unilateral exercises of power. This is a tradition each of
these projects rejects. Moreover, the civil libertarian can point to lessons of
history, whether it be the overreaction and racism that led to Japanese internment or to the ways Posner and Vermeule's national-security necessity
arguments were once used in support of the Nazi regime, lessons which the
apologists dismiss as irrelevant.
In one of the odder sections of Posner and Vermeule's project, they take
up the relevance of Carl Schmitt, a Weimar Republic-era political theorist
turned Nazi academic. 94 In a series of books, Schmitt argued that the

189. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 185.
190. POSNER, supra note 6, at 82.
191. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 191.
192. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (2000) (outlawing torture); Detainee Treatment Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1003, 119 Stat. 2739, 2739 (prohibiting cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment of persons under custody or control of the United States government);
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
supra note 16 (requiring signatory states to criminalize all acts of torture and take effective
measures to prevent acts of torture in all territories under its jurisdiction); Brown v. Mississippi, 297
U.S. 278, 285-86 (1936) (concluding that under due process "[t]he rack and torture chamber may
not be substituted for the witness stand"); Kadic v. Karad~id, 70 F.3d 232, 243 (2d Cir. 1995)
("[T]orture is prohibited by universally accepted norms of international law .... ").
193. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 215.
194. Id. at 38-45.
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sovereign was the entity who had the power to declare a state of
emergency. 95 In academic circles, Schmitt's theories have become relevant
because of their systemic treatment of the notion of a state of emergency and
the role of executive and sovereign power.' 96 With the air of certitude,
Posner and Vermeule dismiss history's relevance as "low" and "not
obvious."' 97 Their position is that it "will not" happen here.' 98 But why not?
This question is particularly relevant given the trust they place in unchecked
executive power. They say that our present situation is not like that of the
Weimar Republic, but this is a claim that depends on contingent circumstances and assumes the route to despotism that the Weimar Republic
followed is the only path a nation might take.
In light of the apologists' deafness to history and blindness to
constitutional tradition, one point to make is that the trade-off thesis unravels
the tension between rights from which derogations are permitted and those
rights from which none are allowed. For example, the state can justify restrictions on speech by showing a compelling need and narrow tailoring. 199
This confines any attempt by the state to justify regulations of speech into an
already-existing script, a public narrative in which particular kinds of reasons
must be provided and particular kinds of public acceptances become
possible.2 °° We understand that to avoid cacophony in the public sphere the
state can regulate the time and place of speech by appealing to the need to
maintain public order, but not by appealing to disapproval of message and
viewpoint. By contrast, no amount of compelling need can justify, after the
ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, the imposition of slavery. Nor can
195. See CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF
SOvEREIGNTY 13 (George Schwab trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2005) (1922) ("For a legal order to
make sense, a normal situation must exist, and he is sovereign who definitely decides whether this
normal situation actually exists.").
196. See, e.g., GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 10 (Kevin Attell trans., Univ. of Chi.
Press 2005) (2003) (citing Carl Schmitt as foremost among authors in favor of constitutional or
legislative provisions legitimizing the state of exception); Sanford Levinson, Preserving
Constitutional Norms in Times of Permanent Emergencies, 13 CONSTELLATIONS 59, 59 (2006)
("The single legal philosopher who provides the best understanding of the legal theory of the Bush
Administration is Carl Schmitt ....); Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a Time of Emergency: States of
Exception and the Temptations of 9/11, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1001, 1009 (2004) ("[T]he place to
start in thinking about theoretical justifications for states of emergency.., is with Carl Schmitt,
who not only attempted to justify the state of exception in a constitutional democracy but who, in
the end, played a role in the demise of the Weimar Constitution itself.").
197. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 39.
198. Id.
199. See Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) ("The Government
may, however, regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a
compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest.").
200. Justifications for regulating speech also depend on the circumstances, as the Supreme
Court has regularly been more solicitous of speech regulations during times of emergency. Justice
Holmes makes the point clear: "When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of
peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight
and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right." Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
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the state violate bodily integrity in particular kinds of ways, such as seizing
body parts, no matter the supposed compelling need.20 '
It is not just that the prohibition against torture is emblematic of the
spirit of a whole body of laws, 2 it is the fact that the arguments used to justify the use of torture know no boundaries-they are equally applicable to
justify the derogation of any number of other rights, emblematic or not. If
torture is necessary, then how much easier it would be to justify the suppression of dissent. After all, no one gets physically harmed by being compelled
to be silent. Moreover, if contingent circumstances give rise to "states of
exception ' '2°3 permitting the use of torture, then other circumstances might
also justify a host of other horribles. History has already shown such horribles to be possible-also justified by appeals to national necessity on behalf
of state security-including, in the United States, such actions as Japanese
internment. 20° It is entirely unclear what principle would hold the line
against the growth of necessity and trade-offs, especially once the additional
topics-mass detention, mass killing, etc.-get introduced as legitimate topics of debate under the rubric of national necessity.
B. Temperament
The American philosopher William James published his lectures on
Pragmatism in 1907, claiming that "[t]he history of philosophy is to a great
extent that of a certain clash of human temperaments., 20 5 Moreover, when
engaging in discussion, philosophers seek to hide this first premise of
temperament. "Temperament is no conventionally recognized reason, so [the
philosopher] urges impersonal reasons only for his conclusions. Yet his
temperament really gives him a stronger bias than any of his more strictly
objective premises.' 20 6 Richard Posner begins his apology from the same
first premise:
Each judge brings to the balancing process preconceptions that may
incline him to give more weight to inroads on personal liberty than to
threats to public safety, while another judge, bringing different
preconceptions to the case, would reverse the weights. The weights
are influenced by personal factors, such as temperament (whether
201. Recall Justice Frankfurter commenting on police forcible seizure of evidence from a
suspect's stomach: "Nothing would be more calculated to discredit law and thereby to brutalize the
temper of a society." Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173-74 (1952).
202. See Waldron, supra note 183, at 1723 (arguing that the prohibition against torture "sums
up or makes vivid to us the point, purpose, principle, or policy of a whole area of law").
203. See AGAMBEN, supra note 196, at 8.
204. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219-20 (1944) ("Compulsory exclusion of
large groups of citizens from their homes, except under circumstances of direst emergency and
peril, is inconsistent with our basic governmental institutions. But when under conditions of
modem warfare our shores are threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect must be
commensurate with the threatened danger.").
205. WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM 8 (Bruce Kuklick ed., Hackett Publ'g 1982) (1907).
206. Id.
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authoritarian or permissive), moral and religious values, life
experiences that may have shaped those values and been shaped by
and revulsions of which the judge may
temperament, and2 sensitivities
7
be quite unaware. 0
The apologist's temperament is decidedly authoritarian, as both projects advocate unfettered executive power to confront emergency situations by
curtailing civil liberties in pursuit of national-security goals.
William James characterizes two dominant temperaments in the history
of philosophy, both of which are applicable to the present topic: the toughand the tender-minded. 20 8 The tough-minded person is the person of decisive
action and empirical facts, whereas the tender-minded person is the person of
thoughtful action and abstract principle. Torture apologists are toughminded persons who seek to achieve security ends by whatever means
necessary, whereas civil libertarians, at least as constructed by Posner and
Vermeule, are tender-minded persons, concerned more with protecting abstract liberties and human dignity than achieving measurable security
benefits. Jay Bybee and John Yoo's Department of Justice memo, the nowinfamous "torture memo," illustrates the tough-minded approach to expanding the permissible realm of executive action.20 9 Speaking on behalf of the
Administration, Vice President Cheney exemplifies the tough-minded approach in official rhetoric:
Now, you can get into a debate about what shocks the conscience and
what is cruel and inhuman. And to some extent, I suppose, that's in
the eye of the beholder. But I believe, and we think it's important to
remember, that we are in a war against a group of individuals and
terrorist organizations that did, in fact, slaughter 3,000 innocent
Americans on 9/11, that it's important for us to be able to have
210
effective interrogation of these people when we capture them.
More generally, tough talk has been the hallmark of the Bush
Administration's response to the events of 9/11-witness the 2004 State of
the Union Address: "After the chaos and carnage of September the 11th, it is
not enough to serve our enemies with legal papers. The terrorists and2their
11
supporters declared war on the United States, and war is what they got.",

207. POSNER, supra note 6, at 24-25.
208. JAMES, supra note 205, at 10.
209. Jay S. Bybee, Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re:
Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), in THE
TORTURE PAPERS 172, 200 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005).
210. Nightline (ABC television broadcast Dec. 19, 2005), excerpt available at http://abcnews.
go.com/Nightline/IraqCoverage/story?id=1419206; see also Dan Eggen, Cheney's Remarks Fuel
Torture Debate, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2006, at A9 (discussing the Vice President's remarks that a
"dunk in water" is a no-brainer).
211. President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2004), available at
4
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/print/200 0120-7.html.
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Following William James, I would like to suggest that the dichotomy
between the tough- and tender-minded is unsustainable. Going forward,
challenges exist for both security and liberty that will require cooperative
engagement among all affected parties and interests. When it comes to the
image of balancing, a more useful project is one that calls on civil libertarians and security experts to work together to fashion policies that respect
liberties while achieving security results. Recall that the easy path will usually be the one that ignores the rule of law, that seeks consequences by the
most expedient means. The hard work is fashioning a workable balance of
concern for specific liberties and protection of particular national-security
interests. Examples of this hard work are found in Bruce Ackerman's proposal for a framework statute, allowing the Executive to take extraordinary
actions in the immediate aftermath of a major terrorist attack but requiring a
swift return to complete normalcy. 212 Posner and Vermeule dismiss this proposal as "gimmicky and infeasible." 21 3 Of course, it is tempting to talk
tough, to make apologies for taking the easy route, and to avoid the hard
work of thinking of creative ways to balance specific liberty and security
values. We should resist the temptation to foster an extreme version of one
temperament over another and strive instead to obtain a pragmatic balance
that draws on the strengths of both.
V.

Silencing Civil Libertarians?

A final aspect of Posner and Vermeule's project is perhaps its most
interesting. Posner and Vermeule confront the role played by public and
academic discussion over the limits and legitimacy of executive emergency
powers. Ordinarily, we might expect public debate to contribute to government policy decisions over the appropriate way to conceptualize and
implement constitutional commitments to liberty while pursuing security.
Posner and Vermeule do not write for ordinary times, however. Because
civil libertarians are not national-security experts, Posner and Vermeule
claim that they have nothing to offer through public2 14
discussion and should be
restrained in their efforts to influence public policy.

Ironically, in the end Posner and Vermeule largely agree with Slavoj
Zi~ek, a critical theorist of left-leaning political persuasion, that academics
and officials should not be discussing the legitimacy of torture, though to be
sure, their agreement is based on very different reasons. 215 Zi~ek argues that
212. See Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1047 (2004)
(proposing a "supermajoritarian escalator," where continued executive emergency power requires
increasingly greater support over time).
213. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 274.
214. Id. at 274-75.
215. Zi~ek argues that commentaries that "do not advocate torture outright, [but] simply
introduce it as a legitimate topic of debate, are even more dangerous than an explicit endorsement of
torture."

SLAVOJ 712EK, WELCOME TO THE DESERT OF THE REAL!: FIvE ESSAYS ON SEPTEMBER

I1 AND RELATED DATES 103 (2002).
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we should not be talking about torture because to do so introduces torture "as
a legitimate topic of debate. ,,216 We do not talk about the prospect of
committing genocide, for example. We do not think about whether other
values might give way at the threshold under emergency conditions, nor do
we pause to consider imaginary sets of circumstances that might make the
systematic murder of a few hundred thousand seem necessary to preserve the
security of the nation, and we do not do so for good reasons. But if we were
to introduce the topic and begin to worry about hypothetical ticking-bomb
scenarios involving killing hundreds of thousands to save hundreds of
millions, we would have introduced genocide as a legitimate topic of debate.
After all, as Posner and Vermeule argue, we do weigh the costs and benefits
of permitting police killings and military killings of civilians for appropriate
purposes, 2 17 and mass killings of some people, if done to promote national
security, are presumably no different. "[I]t is fanatical," Posner and
Vermeule write, to deny "that there can ever be such a thing as a justified
violation of rights, or a necessary evil. 218 In contrast to our collective,
perhaps fanatical, refusal to contemplate genocide, the clamor of discussion
over torture and moral thresholds, consequentialism and practical necessity,
has given the practice of torture a renewed sense of legitimacy.
The very rejection by Posner and Vermeule of protecting absolute rights
against torture relies on the acceptance that at some threshold, even ardent
civil libertarians are willing to forego their commitments for the sake of
avoiding dire consequences. 21 9 Having admitted that, the jape is up, and all
that is left is haggling over the details.22 ° Or so the argument goes. But we
do not make similar arguments about even selective mass killing, although
the same argumentative structure and the same focus on overall social welfare exists. To introduce such topics into serious debate would be beastly.
Indeed, Zi~ek argues that commentaries that "do not advocate torture
outright, [but] simply introduce it as a legitimate topic of debate, are even
more dangerous than an explicit endorsement of torture.",221 Why? Because
"the mere introduction of torture as a legitimate topic allows us to entertain
the idea while retaining a pure conscience. 222 We should simply stop talking about torture.

216. Id.
217. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 184-85.
218. Id. at 187.
219. See Larry Alexander, Deontology at the Threshold, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 893, 896
(2000) (noting that civil libertarians, such as Michael Moore and Robert Nozick, "concede[] the
possibility of a threshold at which consequentialist considerations could override deontological
prohibitions").
220. See Luban, supra note 4, at 1440 (regarding a ticking bomb, "[n]ow that the prohibitionist
has admitted that her moral principles can be breached, all that is left is haggling about the price").
221. ZIZEK, supra note 215, at 103.
222. Id. at 104.
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With regard to philosophers, civil libertarians, and lawyers more
generally, as opposed to national-security experts and executive officials,
Posner and Vermeule couldn't agree with Zi~ek more. The goal of their
book:
is to restrain other lawyers and their philosophical allies from
shackling the government's response to emergencies with intrusive
judicial review and amorphous worries about the second-order effects
of sensible first-order policies. We hope merely to clear the ground
for government to react to emergencies ....

[I]n any case nothing in

the necessary tools for improving on
the lawyer's expertise supplies
223
the govenment's choices.

Moreover, Posner and Vermeule write that with regard to philosophers engaged in discussion of the moral implications of public policy involving
torture, "[t]here is no reason for officials or interested publics to afford their
arguments special weight as philosophical argumentation, rather than the
weight that the opinion of any person in the street deserves on matters of
emergency policy.

'224

Richard Posner also takes up this theme, writing that

"[c]ivil libertarians tend to exaggerate the costs ... and to ignore or slight the
benefits" of security policy.

225

They do this because they are merely lawyers.

In the end, Posner and Vermeule's book boils down to the deflationary claim
that those of us who are philosophers, constitutional scholars, or other concerned lawyers who are not national-security experts or executive officials,
don't know anything relevant, cannot contribute anything relevant, and
should simply cease talking about torture and other security-related matters.
This conclusion raises an interesting question for the Posner and
Vermeule project, written by two law professors who are neither
philosophers nor national-security experts: what expertise must one have to
advance a deflationary, normative metaprinciple about which conversations
we should have and what their content should be? In addressing and purporting to resolve the questions of what conversation and which
interlocutors, as a conceptual and normative matter, should continue, Posner
and Vermeule seem to have circled back into the domain of the philosopher.
It would seem that the consequence of their "hope merely to clear the
ground ' 226 for others to act is normative and conceptual. In their view, we
adopt a particular normative position about what we should do in response to
perceived emergencies based on conceptual understandings of what kinds of
matters are most relevant and what kinds of expertise we have to offer.
Here's the conundrum for the reader contemplating Posner and
Vermeule's conclusion. Since they are nonphilosophers and nonexperts on
security raising conceptual and normative questions with significant
223.
224.
225.
226.

POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 275.
Id. at 274.
POSNER, supra note 6, at 51.
POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 275.
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consequences for human dignity and liberty, then readers are left to wonder
why we should give their arguments any more "weight [than] the opinion of
any person in the street deserves."2 27 They attempt to say what they claim
they have no expertise to say-something about the proper way to conduct
security policy. In so doing they want civil libertarians to be silent, while
allowing apologists to speak. Without a criterion to distinguish some nonexperts from others, then either all nonexperts-the apologists and civil
libertarians-have something to say, or none do. The self-referential trap is
therefore sprung.
There is an additional consequence of their desire to restrain and silence
civil libertarians. If we are to take seriously both claims to balancing, a
proposition this Review calls into doubt at the general and abstract level, then
it is unclear why those who speak on behalf of national security are the only
ones allowed to contribute to policy decisions. Recall that the image of balance imbedded in Justitia is that there is a single issue to be resolved, and the
goddess must weigh the relative merits of arguments for each opposing side
of that issue. The presumption is that there really are two robust sides to
weigh. Balancing, in the hands of the apologists, has only one side-national
security. If national-security experts speak on behalf of both security and
liberty, there is no real sense of balancing and no real sense of paired
advocacy. Of course, this is precisely what Posner and Vermeule seem to
want to eliminate-strong voices speaking on behalf of civil liberties when
specific liberties come into conflict with specific security policies.
Posner and Vermeule state that "[w]hat we do believe is that the
government must make tradeoffs, that policy should become less libertarian
during emergencies, and that courts should stay out of the way. 22 8 The
problem with this claim is that if we take their premise that the trade-off
between liberty and security is a highly circumstantial balancing decision,
which requires deference to the decisions of the Executive, we cannot say ex
ante that a policy should be less libertarian. To say that policy should be less
libertarian during emergencies is to shed deference to the Executive, to reveal a weighted bias in favor of security in the act of balancing, and to
contradict their demurral that they "do not know enough about the underlying
variables to be able to express an informed opinion. '2 29
VI. Conclusion
If one is inclined to take a strong, absolutist position regarding civil
liberties, then neither project will prove persuasive. For nonabsolutists, both
projects advance sustained arguments defending the necessity of trade-offs
between civil liberties and national security and defending deference to

227. Id. at 274.
228. Id. at 158.

229. Id.
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executive-branch decisions, which even if not ultimately successful, make
important contributions to the debate. The problem, as Posner and Vermeule
note, is that almost all those who consider moral dilemmas at the limit are
willing to admit that in some extreme circumstances, even rights against torture might be balanced against national-security interests. Both projects take
this general practice of balancing an asserted right against governmental need
as their initial premise. From a state of balance, both projects conclude that
executive practices such as torture can be justified in some circumstances in
order to protect national security. The practice of torture has many detractors
who believe, in the words of President George W. Bush, that "[t]orture anywhere is an affront to human dignity everywhere, ' '230 but torture has few
apologists.
Both projects explore the grounds upon which such apologies can be
made, in the process advocating deference to executive officials acting to
protect national security and in turn enriching the content of the debate.
Posner and Vermeule claim that a majority of academic lawyers "are
reflexively hostile to executive power in matters of national security. ,,231
This claim is clearly unsustainable. It seems an easy retort to say that if academic lawyers tend to be hostile to anything, they are hostile to
unconstrained executive action. In the history of nations and governments,
examples are all too plenty of governmental use of blunt force and brute tactics to secure protection from real or perceived threats. Taking the Ronald
Reagan rhetoric of a "shining city upon a hill ' 232 seriously, together with the
entire movement of international human rights over the last half century,
liberal democracies have endeavored to conduct the exercise of governmental
powers differently. Liberal democracies have committed to acting within
certain broad constitutional constraints that respect human dignity and promote liberty, even if in so doing achieving some policy objectives is made
more difficult. What liberal democracies really trade off is the easy resort to
torture for the more difficult path of intelligence gathering free from such
abuse. What liberal democracies really trade off is the easy unilateral ability
to detain individuals indefinitely, without charges, for the more troublesome
requirements of due process and access to independent courts. The trade-off
is not merely the abstract formula of balancing liberty and security.
What the American constitutional and pragmatist tradition says to the
world is that although national security is a paramount concern, as it presumably is for every nation, we can achieve security while preserving liberty
and respecting human dignity. In the end, it is the apologist, concerned only

230.
Torture,
231.
232.

See, e.g., Statement on the United Nations International Day in Support of Victims of
1 PUB. PAPERS 701, 701 (June 26, 2003).
POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 274.
Ronald Reagan, Farewell Address to the Nation (Jan. 11, 1989), in ACTOR, IDEOLOGUE,

POLITICIAN: THE PUBLIC SPEECHES OF RONALD REAGAN 322, 326 (Davis W. Houck & Amos

Kiewe eds., 1993).
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for consequences, and not for moral and constitutional principle, who is reflexively hostile-hostile, not to executive action, but executive action under
constitutional constraint. For all their tough talk, the apologists prefer the
ease of unfettered action, while the supposed tender-minded civil libertarian
would undertake the struggle on behalf of principled action. The choice
among temperaments remains ours to make.
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